

JPRS-UMJ-89-008
25 JULY 1989



JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Military History Journal

No 2, February 1989

Soviet Union

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 2, February 1989

JPRS-UMJ-89-008

CONTENTS

25 July 1989

[The following are translations of selected articles from the Russian-language monthly journal VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL published in Moscow. Refer to the table of contents for a listing of any articles not translated.]

Aggressive U.S. Postwar Posturing Led to Cold War [M.A. Garelov; pp 16-31]	1
Initial Period of World War II Examined [L.M. Sandalov; pp 32-40]	12
Lobov on Development of Strategy in 20's, 30's [V.N. Lobov; pp 41-50]	19
Efforts to Strengthen Social, Military Discipline on Eve of WWII Considered [O.F. Suvenirov; pp 51-59]	25
Book on WWII Arms Production, Procurement Reviewed [V.V. Kolechitskiy; pp 60-64]	32
Brief Biography of Vasiliy Stalin [A.N. Kolesnik; pp 65-69]	36
Bukharin-Voroshilov Correspondence on High-Level Purges [O. Fedotov; pp 70-71]	40
Autobiographical Sketch by Uborevich [I.P. Uborevich; pp 81-83]	42
Articles Not Translated from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 2, 1989	44
Publication Data	44

MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

No 2, February 1989

Aggressive U.S. Postwar Posturing Led to Cold War

00010008a VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 16-31

[Introduction and documentary material, published under the heading "Security Classification Lifted," prepared by M.A. Garelov: "From Whence the Threat Derived"]

[Text] The Soviet state began its existence with the Peace Decree. This decree which was signed by Vladimir Ilich Lenin became fundamental to our future military doctrines. Prior to the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Bolsheviks rejected the necessity of a regular army. They were persuaded that a victorious revolution could be defended by a people's militia. However, the internal counterrevolution and interventionists forced a Civil War on our country. It would have been impossible to defend the revolution in the course of this war without a regular army. After the Civil War, our Armed Forces were greatly curtailed and numbered around 500,000 men. In the 1920's and 1930's, the army was based essentially on a territorial-militia system and only a portion of it was regular. This was the status almost until the very start of World War II. Only in 1939 did the Soviet Armed Forces switch to a regular professional system.

These decisions were determined not by a desire to threaten anyone, but rather by the ever-increasing real threat for our nation. These decisions were forced on us. Fascism was raising its head in Europe. Hitler had proclaimed a campaign to the East. The Munich Agreement (September 1938) pushed Nazi aggression in this direction. In Germany the establishing of a professional, regular army was being completed at an accelerated pace. The nation's economy had been switched to a wartime footing. Confronted with this danger we had to take decisions both on increasing the size of the army and developing a defense industry to the detriment of other peacetime programs. At that time, speed actually determined everything. The harsh reality—the necessity of ensuring the nation's security—imposed this on us.

In the prewar years, within a short period of time the Soviet people by their unstinting labor brought the once backward Russia up among the leading world powers and established a firm basis for industrialization and the defense might of the Soviet nation. All of this was of important significance in achieving victory during the Great Patriotic War. The Soviet-German Front was the main theater of World War II. The Soviet people and their Armed Forces bore the main burden of the war and made the decisive contribution to achieving victory over the

Nazi state in World War II. We were victorious in the war not because we were more aggressive. We wanted to end the war more quickly and thereby once and for all put an end to wars.

The Great Patriotic War was the harshest in all history for our motherland and its people. A larger portion of it was waged on our territory. Our human casualties were more than 20 million persons. During the war years, the Nazi invaders completely or partially destroyed and burned down 1,710 towns and settlements, more than 70,000 villages, over 6 million buildings, completely depriving 25 million persons of a roof over their heads. They destroyed 32,000 industrial enterprises and 65,000 km of railroad track and devastated agriculture. The territory of the Soviet Union to the west of the line of Leningrad—Moscow—Astrakhan was in ruins. It had to be restored and built up again. The tank plants again became tractor plants, the plants producing shells began turning out cultivators for agriculture. All the nation's domestic and foreign policy was strictly peace-loving and it could not be otherwise.

Confirmation of this is the fact that the Soviet Union from July 1945 through 1948 reduced the size of its army from 11,365,000 men to 2,874,000. Just in 1945-1946, the number of military districts was reduced by 12. There had been 33 and there were now 21. Military expenditures were reduced from 43 percent of the total national budget in 1945 to 17.9 percent in 1948.

Regardless of all of this, today we are suspected and they endeavor to accuse us that immediately after the war we drew up extensive plans for conquering Europe and even attacking the United States. This has always been done and is being done now in certain Western nations with the sole goal of using the cover of this smokescreen to divert attention of the public from their own aggressive intentions. Immediately after World War II, the main aim of U.S. military doctrine was to destroy the world system of socialism and establish U.S. hegemony. In 1945, in a message to Congress, Truman asserted that the victory in World War II confronted the American people with the constant and burning necessity of world leadership. In subsequent years, this idea was confirmed by all presidents in different forms.

On 23 April, Truman at a White House Conference proposed the dismantling of Soviet-American relations. The military leaders "had a hard time reasoning with their commander-in-chief. They referred to the fact that Allied relations with the USSR would be broken off after the surrender of Tokyo."

On 19 September 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the idea of the United States launching the first strike against a potential enemy. The first document directly aimed against the USSR was a memorandum of the Joint Intelligence Committee No. 329 of 4 September 1945. It should be noted that this was drawn up on the day after the official end of the world war. This stated: "To select

approximately 20 of the most important targets suitable for strategic atomic bombing in the USSR and on the territory controlled by it."

In 1949, the Dropshot Plan was worked out and this was published in New York in 1978 in the form of a book with a subtitle "The American Plan for War Against the Soviet Union in 1957." It was planned that 300 atomic bombs would be dropped in the first strike on 100 Soviet cities. In 1952, Truman endeavored to accelerate the fulfillment of the Drop Shot Plan. He "twice reviewed the possibility of employing the threat of a nuclear war against the USSR." At the beginning of the 1980's, in the personal archives of H. Truman, they found seven yellowed sheets which had been kept since 27 January 1950 under special seal. On that day Truman committed to paper the madness which had overtaken him "on the highest level": the paper recorded a decision to give Moscow "a ten-day ultimatum." It then went on to list the Soviet cities which would be "wiped off the face of the earth." The Dropshot Plan was merely an episode in the chain of postwar planning for different versions of a war against the USSR. The book by the former president R. Nixon is titled "Real War." It is permeated by the idea that World War III began in 1945. In his book "America Retreats From Victory," McCarthy voiced the judgment that "World War II began with the Russian victory at Stalingrad."

The military plans of 1947-1949 were based on the following. In the first place: war against the USSR was a reality if it was impossible to "roll back" world socialism; secondly, the USSR and its allies should not achieve the U.S. level in military and economic terms; thirdly, the United States should be prepared to employ nuclear weapons first.

In March 1948, the National Security Council [NSC] in its Memorandum No. 7 generalized the main goals of American foreign military policy. They were as follows: the defeat of the forces of world communism led by the Soviets is of vitally important significance for American security. This goal could not be achieved with the aid of a defensive policy. For this reason, the United States should assume the leading role in organizing a worldwide counteroffensive in the aim of mobilizing and strengthening its own forces and the anticommunist forces of the non-Soviet world as well as undermining the might of the communist forces.

On 18 August 1948, the NSC Directive No. 20/1 was approved. It was termed "U.S. Goals Toward Russia."

From the introduction:

"The government is forced...to designate definite military goals in relation to Russia even now, in peacetime...."

"Our main goals in relation to Russia are:

"a) To reduce the might and influence of Moscow to limits within which it would not represent a threat to peace and stability of international relations;

"b) Fundamentally change the theory and practice of international relations which are adhered to by the government in power in Russia."

The directive went on to state:

"It is an issue primarily that the Soviet Union be weak in political, military and psychological terms in comparison with the external forces outside its control."

As for the "postwar settlement," here the "planners" were not sufficiently confident of a complete victory and for this reason they offered several variations. For example:

"In the worst instance, that is, with the maintaining of Soviet power over all or virtually all the current Soviet territory, we should demand:

"a) The carrying out of purely military conditions (the surrender of weapons, evacuation of key areas and so forth) in order to guarantee military impotence for a long time;

"b) The fulfillment of conditions in the aim of ensuring significant economic dependence on the outside world.... All the conditions should be emphatically severe and humiliating for the communist regime."

With a more preferred outcome of the war, Directive NSC-20/2 planned:

"We should adopt security measures which would automatically provide a situation where even a noncommunist or a friendly regime for us:

"a) Would not have a strong military potential;

"b) To a significant degree economically would depend on the outside world."

The American military leaders who thought up the plans for the nuclear destruction of the USSR were in no way embarrassed by the fact that Directive NSC-20/1 repeated, in essence, the ideas and in places even literally Hitler's Directive No. 21 on the Barbarossa Plan.

The strategy of the existence of plans prepared by the NSC was approved by H. Truman in the form of Directive No. 30 of 16 September 1948. This stated that the Armed Forces "should be ready immediately and effectively to employ all appropriate means at their disposal, including atomic weapons" and are obliged "to work out the appropriate plans."

Another Directive NSC-10/2 of 1948 also prescribed subversive actions and, certainly, not only in wartime.

The Directive indicated: "Secret operations include propaganda; economic warfare; direct preventive actions, including sabotage...subversive work against hostile states, including assistance to the underground movement.... These activities are to be planned and carried out in such a manner that its organizer, the U.S. government, is not externally apparent and in the event of any disclosures the U.S. government can plausibly deny any responsibility for them."⁷ But the Pentagon leaders mystified by their own directives were in general in no hurry to drop nuclear bombs on the Soviet Union. The U.S. Secretary of the Army persuaded the government: "We spend 98 percent of all the expenditures on atomic energy in manufacturing weapons. If we do not intend to employ them now, then this does not make any sense."⁸

Nor were the legislators silent. The chairman of the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy MacMahon openly called for the start of a war. "War against the Russians is inevitable," he asserted. It is essential "to wipe them from the face of the earth and the faster.... The entire world rotates around the exploding atom—all consists in this and there is no other hope."⁹ In November 1947, the Air Force General H. Vandenberg asked the question of what would be destroyed in the event of a war: "the Russian people, industry, the communist party or everything all together?"¹⁰

On 23 November 1948, the Memorandum NSC-20/1 was adopted and where the main provisions of Directive NSC-20/1 were confirmed and the notion established according to which the USSR was "the only major threat to the United States in the foreseeable future."¹¹ Directive NSC-20/4 was the basis for drawing up the subsequent plans for atomic bombing of the USSR. By the end of the year (21 December), the Air Force commander-in-chief had submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an assessment of the plans for a strategic air offensive and here it stated:

"2. War will begin before 1 April 1949.

"3. Atomic bombs will be employed on such a scale as would be possible and desirable....

"32a. After a careful examination of the questions concerning the number of existing atomic bombs, the operational radius of Allied aviation, the approximate bombing precision, the possible scale of the raid and the time necessary for implementing it, it is very important to designate the areas where the most significant Soviet industrial centers are located....

"...c. Maps designating the targets and the routes of flight for carrying out the operations involving the first 70 cities will be ready by 1 February 1949."¹²

The scale of the atomic strike varied depending upon the stockpiling of atomic bombs. In mid-1948, the Charioteer Plan appeared. War was to begin "by concentrated raids from bases in the Western Hemisphere and England employing atomic bombs against governmental, political

and administrative centers, industrial centers and individual enterprises of the oil industry."¹³ There were plans to drop 133 atomic bombs on 70 Soviet cities (these figures were confirmed by the plan of Operation Truejohn approved in December 1948), including 8 on Moscow and 7 on Leningrad. Then they planned to drop another 200 bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs. Charioteer was replaced by an integrated Plan Halfmoon which later was renamed Fleetwood and then Doublestar.¹⁴

For an analysis of the possible consequences of an atomic attack on the USSR, at the beginning of 1949, a special committee was established headed by Gen H. Harmon. On 11 May of the same year, the committee presented its supersecret report "Assessment of the Consequences of a Strategic Air Offensive on the Battleworthiness of the USSR." The committee concluded that such an offensive was "the only means for causing sudden and serious damage to vitally important elements of the Soviet military potential.... It would be advisable to undertake it at the initial stage, as this would provide very significant and permanent advantages."¹⁵ According to the assessments of the committee, the first atomic strike would lead to the death of 2.7 million persons and with 4 million wounded.

Proceeding from these premises, the committee concluded that superior to everything are the "advantages of the early employment of atomic weapons." The report encouraged broadened production of nuclear weapons. In the autumn of 1949, Truman approved a significant increase in nuclear weapons production which had been requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the Harmon Committee Report. In the following year, according to the Offtackle Plan, there were plans to attack 104 cities employing 220 atomic bombs. Some 72 bombs were to be kept in reserve for a second strike.

In actuality the United States was preparing for war against the Soviet Union. The world was approaching a disaster. The plans for the attack on the USSR were worked out one after another. The U.S. economy was switched to a wartime footing. Militaristic ideas were to be introduced at full pace in the awareness and psychology of the people. The aims of the propaganda policy came down to arousing hate for the Soviet Union. Constant efforts were taken to implicate the Western European states in preparing for atomic war. The shock force of aggression, NATO, was established. This was in the spring of 1949.

But in the autumn of the same year an event occurred which marked the end to American military supremacy. On 3 September 1949, a B-29 bomber which was flying over the Northern Pacific detected increased radioactivity. It became clear that an atomic bomb had been tested in the Soviet Union. TASS announced: "...The Soviet Union had mastered the secret of nuclear weapons as early as 1947.

"As for the alarm being spread over this matter by certain foreign circles, there are no grounds for concern.

It must be said that the Soviet government, regardless of its possession of nuclear weapons, stands and intends to stand in the future on its old position of an unconditional banning of the use of nuclear weapons."¹⁶

All the same, military preparations in the United States continued. Plans for a preventive strike were hatched out. A new date was set for the war: 1 January 1950. They planned to drop 300 atomic bombs and 20,000 tons of conventional bombs on 100 Soviet cities. The new plan was named Trojan. But an analysis showed that the losses would be too great, surprise and speed would not be ensured, the bases on the British Isles could be destroyed and there would not be enough forces to defend Western Europe. The American Secretary of the Air Force received a report on 11 April 1950: "The U.S. Air Force cannot: a) completely implement the air offensive according to the Trojan Plan; b) provide air defense for the territory of the United States and Alaska."¹⁷

The unleashing of the war was put off.

The Directive NSC-68 was particularly adventuristic. It was approved by H. Truman on 30 September 1950 and fully confirmed the goals set out in Directive NSC-20/4.

The authors of the Memorandum on which Directive NSC-68 was based had written: "The Soviet threat to U.S. security has increased sharply. It has the same character as indicated in Directive NSC-20/4 approved by the president on 24 November 1948, however it is significantly closer than was previously felt. The republic and its citizens at the zenith of their might are exposed to the most terrible danger. It is a question of the life and death not only of the republic but of all civilization."¹⁸ As we can see, the American politicians of those times were great masters of demagoguery even in secret documents.

Directive NSC-68 clearly reflected the interests of the military-industrial complex. A significant increase in military outlays was recommended, including up to 50 percent of the nation's gross national product. In addition to purely militaristic aims, the hope was voiced of drawing the USSR into a new arms race and by this bleed it white. The directive also contained the noteworthy words: "We are challenged to state that we will not employ atomic weapons except in response to the use of these weapons by the aggressor.... If we do not intend to abandon our goals, we cannot sincerely make such a statement until we are certain that we are capable of attaining our goals without a war or in the event of war, without employing atomic weapons for strategic and tactical purposes."¹⁹

The Directive was a program, it not only envisaged the growth of weapons and readiness for war itself but also demanded the "sowing of seeds of destruction within the Soviet system," the conducting of "overt psychological warfare" and carrying out "measures and operations by secret means in the areas of economic, political and

psychological warfare." The policy of "containment" was described as a policy of "gradual coercion."

Sounding very similar to what certain figures in the 1980's are saying are the ultimate goals of the Directive, although set out more than 30 years ago. Here they are:

"1. We should become strong both in affirming our principles in national life as well as in the development of our military and economic might.

"2. We should be the first in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world.

"3. But, in addition to affirming our principles, our policy and actions should bring about fundamental changes in the nature of the Soviet system.... If these changes are basically the result of the action of internal forces in Soviet society, they will be more effective and cost us less."²⁰

During the last year of the administration of H. Truman, the world was particularly close to atomic war. Having become involved in the Korean adventure, the American ruling circles did not know how to end it. And again came atomic blackmail and threats. The American president on 27 January 1952 wrote: "It seems to me that the correct decision here would be an ultimatum with a 10-day period warning Moscow that we intend to blockade the Chinese coast from the Korean frontier to Indochina and that we intend to destroy all military bases in Manchuria...we will destroy all ports or cities in order to achieve our peaceful aims.... This means all-out war. This means that Moscow, St. Petersburg, Mukden, Vladivostok, Peking, Shanghai, Port Arthur, Dairen, Odessa and Stalingrad as well as all industrial enterprises in China and the Soviet Union will be wiped off the face of the earth. This is the last chance for the Soviet government to decide whether or not it merits existing!"²¹

In completing his presidency, H. Truman left his successor an overall concept of strategic planning in which a decisive role was assigned to the first nuclear strike.

In the first directives on the questions of war, after D. Eisenhower assumed the presidency, mention of a first nuclear strike was eliminated but soon this reappeared. Already on 7 October 1953, at a session of the National Security Council it was decided that "in the event of military operations the United States will view the possibility of employing nuclear weapons on the same basis as other weapons." The U.S. military leadership again proposed the idea of a first nuclear strike, but now concealed behind more active discussions about the defensive, in being frightened by Soviet nuclear attack and so forth. Far-fetched arguments began that "the Soviet threat" would confront the United States with the need to "begin a war for the sake of ensuring its own defense." According to the Solarium Plan, an ultimatum was to be presented to the Soviet Union with a demand

to agree to the American conditions. A refusal would mean war. This version was seriously discussed by D. Eisenhower and J. Dulles. In the new Directive of the NSC-5410/1 the goal was formulated as follows: "The achieving of a victory which will guarantee the survival of the United States."²²

Numerous military-political plans for preventive war arose. For example, a long-range research group under the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed reviewing the possibility of an "intentional acceleration of a war with the USSR in the near future" before "the Soviet thermonuclear potential will become a real threat."²³ Although the plans for a preventive strike did not gain official approval, the question of an attack on the USSR had not been eliminated. Now they began speaking about a "pre-emptive strike." The Air Force Commander Lemay stated that "we will not hesitate to attack first." The general realized that the U.S. propaganda machine could easily fabricate the reasons for a "pre-emptive strike." The strategy of a preventive strike did not remain long in verbal disgrace. In March 1954, President Eisenhower assigned a scientific consultative commission to make a study of the problem of a surprise attack in the thermonuclear age. The commission considered it essential to accelerate the development of the ballistic missile.²⁴

And while the disputes were going on concerning the priority objectives of attack, the Pentagon continued to favor the idea of a surprise disarming strike. For example, the Weapons System Evaluation Group 12 asserted that the realization of a scenario of an atomic offensive as set out in the unified plan for the employment of strategic weapons could ensure the achieving of the ultimate goal of stopping an all-out war in one strike. Such a strike would destroy virtually the entire Soviet potential for atomic weapons production, it would devastate 118 of the 134 major cities, it would cause the death of 60 million persons and "would virtually annihilate the industrial potential of the Soviet bloc." But the same report contained a warning that even if the strategic aviation were to destroy all 645 airfields assigned to it as targets, a minimum of 240 airfields would remain on which the Soviet bombers could be dispersed and where they could survive in an attack.²⁵ This was considered sufficient for a retaliatory strike against the United States and its allies.

A new date loomed for an attack on the USSR, 1 January 1957. The code name of the plan Dropshot envisaged the involvement of all the NATO countries. In preparing to carry it out, the Americans intensified the collection of intelligence information. Upon the initiative of the CIA, Operation Moby Dick was carried in the course of which large air balloons carrying Air Force cameras were released over Soviet territory from Western Europe to Japan. The Ringer Program was also carried out (from 1949 through 1953). It involved 1,300 military and civilian employees in West Germany, Austria and Japan and they interrogated former Soviet citizens for ascertaining a list of objectives for atomic attack.²⁶

The date for carrying out the Dropshot Plan undoubtedly was linked to completing the remilitarization of West Germany and was designed for maximum use of the West German and Japanese "cannon fodder." The territory and population of these countries were doomed to destruction.

In the first stage of the war they planned to drop on the Soviet Union over 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs and destroy up to 85 percent of industry. In the second stage, offensive operations would be continued and the NATO ground forces would be readied: 164 divisions, including 69 American ones. In the third stage, 114 NATO divisions would go over to the offensive from the West, and 50 divisions from the south (with a landing on the Black Sea Coast). All of this, according to the plan, would force the USSR to surrender. As a whole, according to the Dropshot Plan, they planned to activate a united army numbering 20 million men. Having thus dealt with the Soviet Union, the American militarists were planning the future of the Soviet people. In the first place, the USSR would be occupied. The ground occupation troops would number 1 million men organized in 38 divisions. The territory of the Soviet Union would be divided into four zones: the western part of the USSR, the Caucasus—Ukraine, Urals—Western Siberia—Turkestan, Eastern Siberia—Transbaykal—Primorye [Maritime Province]. The zones were divided into 22 subregions. Moscow would have two occupation divisions and one each in 20 other Soviet cities. Punitive functions were also included in the duties of the occupation troops. The main task of the occupation troops was "the destruction of the organizational structure by which the communist party leaders were capable of having a political, moral and educational influence on individual citizens or groups of citizens...." These are documentary data.

Regardless of all of this, the Soviet Union continued to steadfastly carry out a peace-loving policy, acting against the division of Europe into military blocs and making proposals for the elimination and banning the employment of nuclear weapons.

At the same time when confronted with these harsh realities under the conditions of the insipient Cold War, and considering the growing military threat, the Soviet Union was forced to somewhat strengthen its Armed Forces and take retaliatory measures against the nuclear threat. But at the beginning of the 1960's, the Soviet Armed Forces were again reduced to 1.2 million men.

The policy of the Soviet state remained peace-loving and the military plans remained strictly defensive.

The Director of the Institute of Modern History at Ohio State University, G.L. Geddis, has endeavored to dispute this. He shows that certainly the USSR also had plans of aggression and even attack on the United States.²⁷ And that similar plans are worked out in any professional military organization. There is no grounds

for such an assertion. Plans can differ. Let us examine this question from the viewpoint of the facts and logic. How and with what could the USSR carry out such an attack on the United States?

First of all, our nation did not have the necessary Navy for this, while the United States and Great Britain had 167 aircraft carriers of all classes, 7,700 carrier-based aircraft while the USSR had neither one nor the other, in terms of submarines: the United States and Great Britain had 405 and the USSR 173 (a ratio of 2.3:1); ships of the line and large cruisers: them 36 and us 34 (9:1), cruisers 135 and 10 (13.5:1); destroyers and torpedo boats 1,059 and 57 (18.6:1). The USSR had virtually no landing craft while in 1947, the United States had 1,114 of them and 628 troop transports.

In March 1946, the United States had already established the Strategic Air Command and four strategic air armies had been formed (8th, 15th, 20th and 21st Air Armies) and each of these included two or three air divisions. In 1947, the SAC of the U.S. Air Force included just the 8th and 15th Air Armies in which there were 316 strategic bombers, including 148 B-29 (with a payload of over 9,000 kg and a range of 7,300 km).

In 1947, the Soviet Union had virtually no strategic aviation. In the long-range aviation there were just 1,839 aircraft (predominantly the Il-4, Li-2 and 32 TB-7 aircraft). Their range did not exceed 1,500-2,000 km.

At the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces submitted to the Higher Military Council a "Plan for the Active Defense of the Territory of the Soviet Union." According to this plan, the following tasks were set for the Armed Forces:

- Ensure the dependable repulse of aggression and the integrity of the frontiers set by international agreements after World War II;
- The Navy was to be ready to repel possible aggression from the sea sectors and provide support for the Ground Forces operating in maritime areas.

For carrying out these tasks, it was envisaged that the Armed Forces on the main sectors should consist of the following:

- a) A blocking army [armiya otpora] which would include the troops of the fortified area;
- b) The troops of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command;
- c) Secondary troops and new formations for supplying primarily these sectors in the course of military operations. The second and third components were to be deployed only for the time of the war to repel aggression.

The Main Tasks of the Armed Forces Were Determined in the Following Manner

The blocking army, relying on the fortified areas, was to defeat the enemy in the area of the border defensive zone and prepare conditions for going over to a counteroffensive. Simultaneously with all this, it was to have ready the necessary forces for destroying enemy assault forces in the border defensive zone.

The Air Forces and Air Defense Troops which were part of the blocking army were to securely cover the main forces of the blocking army from the air and be in constant readiness to repel a surprise attack by enemy aviation.

The troops of the Reserve of the Supreme High Command were assigned, together with the blocking army, to launch a crushing blow against the main enemy forces, to defeat them as well as participate in the counteroffensive.

In addition to these tasks, the reserve troops were always to be ready with a portion of their forces to eliminate possible enemy air and amphibious assaults and for this purpose the operational plan assigned for the reserve troops a territory for which they were responsible in antilanding terms.

The secondary troops were to be maintained in peacetime at reduced TOE. The secondary troops were to be mobilized no later than the 7th day of mobilization and by the 10th-20th day (approximately) completely finish the concentration close to the front in the areas previously assigned for them or in areas depending upon the situation for building up the effort to repel the aggression.

The naval forces in the initial period of a war were to be limited to assisting the blocking army by landing amphibious troops, supporting the maritime flanks, preventing the landing of enemy amphibious troops as well as reasonable independent operations such as: disrupting the enemy sea-lanes, laying mine obstacles and covering important maritime sectors.

The USSR, in having neither the corresponding naval forces nor a strategic aviation, could not even conceive of attacking a state located many thousands of kilometers away. The troop groups and military districts in accord with this had exclusively defensive tasks and plans. This can be clearly seen from the "operational plan of the group of Soviet occupation forces in Germany," the most important grouping of the Soviet Armed Forces. The entire plan and the tasks set for the armies, aviation and other combat arms were permeated with defensive aims and defensive methods of action. This plan until quite recently was top secret. At present, with the permission of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, we are publishing it.

One should draw attention to the important circumstance that according to the set tasks and according to the decision of the commander-in-chief of the group, it was planned that the main efforts would be concentrated 50-150 km from the East German state frontier, and there would be only cover units ahead. It is not difficult to realize that with any offensive intentions of the grouping, the defenses could not be organized in such a manner. And even the planned counterstrikes deep in the defenses envisaged only the restoring of the situation in the defenses. Thus, the entire plan has an exclusively defensive nature. The other troop groups and military districts also had similar tasks and plans.

All of this convincingly confirms the absence of any aggressive intentions by the Soviet Union and the exclusively defensive nature of the strategic and operational plans of the Soviet Armed Forces.

At present, when the new political thinking is gaining strength throughout the world and when positive changes are occurring in the relations between the USSR and the United States, the interests of the matter require not confrontation but rather the search for new ways of collaboration between our countries, including in the military area. For this there must be above all an objective approach to an analysis of both historical and contemporary events.

Footnotes

1. Th. Etzold and J.L. Gaddis, "Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950," New York, 1978, p 174. (Subsequently, "Containment...")
2. "Containment...", p 176.
3. Ibid., p 189.
4. Ibid., pp 196-197.
5. Ibid.
6. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Spring 1983, Vol 7, No 4, p 13.
7. "Containment...", p 127.
8. Ibid., p 391.
9. D. Lilienthal, "The Journals of D. Lilienthal," New York, 1964, Vol 2, p 391.
10. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p 13.
11. "Containment...", p 204.
12. Ibid., pp 357-358.
13. A. Brown (Editor), "Dropshot," New York, 1978, p 5.

14. "Containment...", p 324.
15. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p 16.
16. PRAVDA, 25 September 1949.
17. Brown (Editor), op. cit., p 24.
18. FOREIGN RELATIONS..., Vol 1, pp 238, 289.
19. Ibid., pp 268, 269.
20. Ibid., p 241.
21. PRAVDA, 15 December 1980.
22. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, pp 33-34.
23. Ibid., p 34.
24. Ibid., p 39.
25. Ibid., p 21.
26. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, p 21.
27. PRAVDA, 31 October 1988.

OPERATIONAL PLAN OF ACTIONS FOR GROUP OF SOVIET OCCUPATION TROOPS IN GERMANY

5 November 1946

Map 500,000

Top Secret

Highly Important

Approved

**Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation
Troops in Germany, MSU Sokolovskiy**

**Military Council Member
of Group of Soviet Occupation
Troops in Germany
Lt Gen Makarov**

In line with the change in the composition and grouping of the Group as a result of organizational measures and in the aims of establishing the best conditions in this situation for the combat operations of the Group in the event of their outbreak as well as for ensuring the necessary security on the line of contact for our troops, the following measures are to be carried out:

1. On the line of contact of our troops some 920 km long, the 3d Shock Army and the 8th Guards Army are to set

out posts solely on roads. In the interior, some 3-5 km away from the posts, a denser network of German police posts is to be set out.

As a total for organizing outposts on the line of contact in the entire zone of the Group, not more than four rifle regiments are to be assigned.

2. The forward edge of the main defensive zone is to run along the line: Wiesmar, Schweriner See, Ludwigslust, Lenzen, the Elbe River to Barby (30 km to the southeast of Magdeburg) and then along the Saale River to Saalburg (30 km to the west of Plauen), then Elsnitz, Adorf, Brambach. The length of this line along the forward edge is 515 km.

Close to this line the main forces of the rifle and mechanized divisions of the 3d Shock and 8th Guards Armies are to be stationed as well as their army reinforcement formations and units.

Reconnaissance is to be carried out:

a) In the second defensive zone with a forward edge along the line: Rostock, Warnow River, Gustrow, Krakow, the eastern bank of Lake Plauer, Wittstock, Dosse River, Wusterhausen, Rathenow, Brandenburg, Ziesar, Loburg, Roslau, the eastern bank of the Mulde River to Bitterfeld, Delich, Leipzig, Groitzsch, Zeitz, Gera, Greiz, Plauen;

b) The third (rear) army defensive zone with a forward edge along the line: Damgarten (35 km to the southeast of Rostock), Triebes, Mennin, the east bank of Lake Kummerower, Waren, the east bank of Lake Muritz, Furstenberg, Zehdenick, Libenwalde Uterbog, the east bank of the Havel River, the western outskirts of Berlin, Saarmund, Trebbisch, Luckenwalde, Uterbog, Schweinitz, Prettich, Torgau, Muhlberg, Oschatz, Waldheim, Mittweida, Chemnitz, Olbersdorf, Meldenau, Konigswalde.

On the basis of the reconnaissance with the commanders of the corps, divisions and the chiefs of the combat arms and services, there is to be a dividing up into zones, areas and regions and the allocating of forces to the entire depth of the main defensive zone with cooperation worked out between the combat arms, having coordinated their actions on the boundaries.

No engineer work is to be carried out in all the zones until special orders.

3. On the main sectors in the zone between the line of contact of our troops and the main defensive zone, facilities are to be prepared for establishing obstacles. One-third of the army combat engineers is to be kept ready for organizing obstacle building detachments. Here basic attention should be given to road junctions.

4. The most probably axes for actions by large enemy forces would be:

—1. Helmstedt, Magdeburg, Berlin.

—2. Hamburg, Schwerin.

—3. Kassel, Leipzig.

—4. Hof, Plauen, Leipzig.

Here Helmstedt, Magdeburg, Berlin must be considered the most important axes. Proceeding from this assessment:

—The densest troop grouping in the main defensive zone is to be established on the following sectors:

1. Burg, Magdeburg, Bernburg with the task of covering the Berlin axis.

2. Halle, Kahla (10 km to the south of Jena) with the task of preventing an enemy breakthrough on the Leipzig axis and the reaching of Berlin.

3. Saalburg (30 km to the west of Plauen), Elsnitz with the task of preventing an enemy breakthrough on the axis Plauen, Leipzig;

—In the first echelon of the 3d Shock Army and the 8th Guards Army, there are to be rifle divisions and mechanized regiments from the mechanized divisions of the rifle corps. In the second echelon of these armies, there are to be the tank regiments from the mechanized divisions of the rifle corps and the 11th Tank Division on the axes of probable enemy actions with the task together with the infantry, artillery and aviation of preventing an enemy breakthrough on the main defensive zone until the arrival of the mechanized armies.

—The main task of destroying the advancing enemy is to be assigned to the 1st and 2d Guards Mechanized Armies with support from the artillery and aviation of the Group, and for this reason provision is to be made:

1) For a simultaneous strike on the Magdeburg sector, the use of the 1st and 2d Guards Mechanized Armies with support from the basic mass of artillery and aviation.

2) For a strike on the Schwerin sector by the 2d Guards Mechanized Army.

3) For a strike on the Leipzig sector by the 1st Guards Mechanized Army.

The artillery of the Group is to be employed as follows: the army artillery by orders of the army commanders in

the fighting on the main defensive zone and in the forward security area with the highest density on the threatened sectors.

For maneuvering in each army, an antitank reserve is to be organized and the actions of this are to be worked through on the axis of the counterstrikes being prepared. The artillery of the High Command Reserve is to be employed on a centralized basis, by orders of the Group commander-in-chief.

The main artillery grouping is to consist of: the 4th AKP [Artillery Command Post] (the 5th and 6th Artillery Divisions, the 34th Cannon Artillery Division, the 3d and 4th Guards iptabr [antitank artillery brigade]) for fighting to hold the main defensive zone on the Magdeburg-Berlin axis.

For maneuvering plans are to use the 5th Artillery Battalion on the Schwerin axis and the 3d Guards iptabr on the Leipzig axis.

The following antiaircraft artillery is to be employed:

The 24th and 32d Antiaircraft Artillery Divisions for covering the main grouping of forces on the Magdeburg sector and the crossing over the Elbe on the sector Stendal, Magdeburg.

The 2d Guards Antiaircraft Division for covering the field headquarters of the Group.

The 6th and 10th Antiaircraft Artillery Division for covering the main rear facilities of the Group in the areas of:

—Kustrin, Furstenwalde, Frankfurt a.d. Oder;

—Berlin.

Aviation is to be employed on a centralized basis for launching massed strikes by all the forces on the Magdeburg—Berlin axis. For maneuvering on the flanks and for supporting the actions of the 2d and 1st Guards Mechanized Armies, in the event of their employment on the flanks of the Group, one-third of all the forces of the air army is to be assigned, airfields are to be readied ahead of time for the basing of the assigned aviation and provision made for assigning operations groups to the command posts of the 3d Shock Army and the 8th Guards Army.

The main tasks of aviation.

—Repel massed enemy air raids on the territory of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany. The main efforts of our aviation are to be focused on repelling enemy air raids against the base areas of the 16th Air Army and against the main groupings of ground troops depending upon the situation.

Subsequently, aviation is to cover the moving up of the 2d and 1st Guards Mechanized Armies and their concentration in the initial areas for launching counterstrikes:

2d Guards Mechanized Army—Putlitz, Perleberg, Pritzwalk or Plaue, Ziesar, Belzig, Brandenburg;

1st Guards Mechanized Army—Nedlitz, Zerbst, Dessau, Koswig, Goritz or Leipzig, Borna, Wuzen.

—In the event that air reconnaissance detects large enemy columns in approaching the main zone of our defenses, they are to be destroyed by bomber and ground attack strikes.

—The ground troops are to be assisted in holding the main defensive zone, particularly on the sector Magdeburg, Berlin and support the 1st and 2d Guards Mechanized Armies in their launching of counterstrikes against the breaching enemy.

f) Engineer Troops:

Not more than one-third of the engineer forces and demolition equipment in an amount necessary for supporting the actions of the obstacle building detachments is to be employed between the contact line of our troops and the main defensive zone. The remaining engineer forces of the army are to be employed in the main defensive zone.

With the start of hostilities, the military construction detachments of the UOS [defensive construction directorate] are to be employed with the local population for carrying out fortification work on the second and army defensive zones.

In the Group's reserve there is to be one combat engineer and one heavy pontoon bridge regiment.

g) The Dnieper Naval Flotilla is to be employed for supporting the combat actions of the units of the 1st and 2d Guards Mechanized Armies to destroy the enemy in the Berlin area.

After the annihilation of the enemy in the Berlin area, the flotilla is to support the actions of the 3d Shock Army on the axes:

—Northwestern—the Havel River Waterway, Lower Havel, Elbe River, with an auxiliary egress to the Elbe River, the Havel Waterway—Murnitz—Elde;

—Western—the Havel River Waterway, Plauer Canal, Elbe River, Ems Canal, Weser—Elbe.

5. In the event of the outbreak of military operations:

a) The individual guard posts, without losing contact with the enemy, are to conduct reconnaissance and

together with the obstacle building detachments are to check the advance of the enemy in the aim of gaining the necessary time to organize a defense on the main defensive line.

For carrying out this task, the military commandant offices of the towns are also to be employed with their organic subunits and which are located to the west of the forward edge of the main defensive zone. These commandant offices with the outbreak of hostilities are to be under the commanders of the armies in the zones of which they are by the start of hostilities.

- b) The main forces of the rifle divisions with the appearance of the first indications of the outbreak of hostilities are to be pulled back to the main zone and take up the defensive together with the mechanized regiments, the mechanized divisions of the rifle corps with the heaviest density on the main sectors.
- c) The first and second Guards Mechanized Armies upon alert are to be brought to combat readiness and depending upon the situation move up to the forming-up places for launching counterstrikes. These armies are to move up under special orders from the Group commander-in-chief.
- d) The artillery formations of the reserve upon the alert are to be brought to combat readiness and depending upon the situation by special order of the Group commander-in-chief are to move up to the threatened sectors for repelling the enemy, particularly its tank and mechanized units, together with the combined-arms and mechanized armies.
- e) The antiaircraft artillery divisions (2d Guards, 24th, 32d, 6th and 10th Antiaircraft Divisions) and all the fighter aviation of the 16th Air Army upon alert are to take their places according to the plan ready to immediately repulse enemy air raids in accord with the Group's air defense plan.

6. Tasks of the armies:

- a) The 3d Shock Army consisting of the IX Rifle Corps (94th Guards Rifle Division, 18th Mechanized Division), LXXIX Rifle Corps (207th Rifle Division and 15th Mechanized Division), the 11th Tank Division with army formations and units—is to prepare a defensive in the zone—To the right—the coast of the Baltic Sea;

To the left—Luckau, Ragun (15 km to the south of Dessau), Aschersleben, Quedlinburg, Stapelburg. All points for the 3d Shock Army inclusively.

The densest troop grouping in the main defensive zone is to be found on the sectors:

- 1) Wiesmar, Lake Schweriner-See.

- 2) Ludwigslust, Wittenberg.

- 3) Burg, Magdeburg, Bernburg.

Counterstrikes by the second echelons and reserves are to be readied on the axes:

- 1. Gustrow, Wiesmar and Parchim, Neustadt-Glewe, Wittenburg—in cooperation with the 2d Guards Mechanized Army.
- 2. Putlitz, Wittenberg—in cooperation with the 2d Guards Mechanized Army and the 5th Artillery Division.
- 3. Rathenow, Wavelberg—in cooperation with the 5th and 6th Artillery Divisions and a brigade of river vessels from the Danube Naval Flotilla.
- 4. Brandenburg, Magdeburg—in cooperation with the 2d Guards Mechanized Army, the 5th and 6th Artillery Divisions and the 4th Guards iptabr.
- 5. Dessau, Magdeburg and Dessau, Bernburg—in cooperation with the 1st Guards Mechanized Army, the 3d and 4th Guards iptabr.

The construction of defensive perimeters is to be prepared in the area of Schwerin and on the west bank of the Elbe River at the points of Tangermunde, Magdeburg.

- b) 8th Guards Army consisting of: XXIX Guards Rifle Corps (57th Guards Rifle Division, 82d Guards Rifle Division and 21st Guards Mechanized Division), the XXVIII Guards Rifle Corps (39th Guards Rifle Division and 20th Mechanized Division) with army formations and units is to prepare the defensive in the zone:

On the right—Luckau, Ragun (15 km to the south of Dessau), Aschersleben, Quedlinburg, Stapelburg. All points for the 8th Guards Army are inclusive;

On the left—the border with Czechoslovakia.

The densest troop grouping in the main defensive zone should exist in the sectors:

- 1) Halle, Kahla (10 km to the south of Jena) with the task of preventing an enemy breakthrough on the Leipzig axis and its moving up on the Berlin axis.
- 2) Saalburg (30 km to the west of Plauen), Elsnitz with the task of preventing an enemy breakthrough and its moving up on the northern and northeastern axes.

In cooperation with the 1st Guards Mechanized Army and the 3d Guards iptabr counterstrikes are to be prepared on the axes:

- 1) Leipzig, Landsberg, Bernburg.

- 2) Pegau, Naumburg.
- 3) Along the Gera—Jena Autobahn.
- 4) Greiz, Plauen.

Alternate positions are to be prepared with the front to the north:

1. On the sector Bernburg, Aschersleben.
2. On the sector Esnitz, Wettin.

Responsibility for supporting the boundary between the 3d Shock Army and the 8th Guards Army is to rest with the commander of the 8th Guards Army.

- c) 2d Guards Mechanized Army consisting of: 1st Tank Division, 9th and 12th Guards Tank Divisions and 1st Mechanized Division with army formations and units—is to practice the actions of the army troops as follows:

1. From the region of Malchin, Teterow, Gustrow, Krakow, Damen on the axes:

- a) Gustrow, Rostock with the task of cooperation with the South Baltic Fleet in preventing the landing of amphibious forces on the Baltic Sea Coast in the Rostock area;
- b) Gustrow, Wiesmar with the task in cooperation with units of the 3d Shock Army to prevent the enemy from breaking through the main defensive zone on the sector Wiesmar, Lake Schweriner-See.

2. From the region Putlitz, Perleberg, Pritzwalk on the axes: Putlitz, Ludwigslust and Putlitz, Perleberg, Wittenberg—with the task in cooperation with troops of the 3d Shock Army and the 5th Artillery Division to prevent an enemy breakthrough of the main defensive zone on the sector: Ludwigslust, Wittenberg.

3. From the region of Plaue, Ziesar, Belzig, Brandenburg on the axes: Ziesar, Magdeburg and Belzig, Dessau, Bernburg with the task in cooperation with troops of the 3d Shock Army and the 1st Guards Mechanized Army, the 5th and 6th Artillery Divisions and the 4th Guards iptabr to prevent an enemy breakthrough of the main defensive zone on the sector Burg, Magdeburg, Bernburg.

Particular attention is to be paid to ensuring the quickest maneuver for a thrust on the Magdeburg axis.

- d) The 1st Guards Mechanized Army consisting of: the 9th Tank Division, the 11th Guards Tank Division, the 8th and 19th Guards Mechanized Divisions with army formations and units is to practice the actions of the army troops as follows:

1. From the region of Nedlitz (40 km to the east of Magdeburg), Dessau, Koswig, Goritz on the axis: Zerbst, Magdeburg and Dessau, Bernburg with the task in cooperation with the troops of the 3d Shock Army, the 2d Guards Mechanized Army, the 3d and 4th Guards iptabr to prevent an enemy breakthrough on the sector Magdeburg, Bernburg.

2. From the region of Leipzig, Borna, Wurzen on the axes: Leipzig, Bernburg and Leipzig, Naumburg with the task in cooperation with troops of the 8th Guards Army, the 3d and 4th Guards iptabr to prevent an enemy breakthrough of the main defensive zone on the sector Bernburg, Halle, Naumburg.

3. From the region of Altenburg, Krimmitschau, Glauhau on the axes: Gera, Jena, along the autobahn and Glauhau, Plauen with the mission to prevent an enemy breakthrough of the main defensive zone on the sector: Gera, Plauen.

Particular attention is to be paid to ensuring the quickest maneuver for a thrust on the Magdeburg axis.

7. Organization of rear services:

Army bases of the 3d Shock Army and 6th Guards Army are to be readied and positioned:

3d Shock Army—in the Rathenow area.

8th Guards Army—in the Chemnitz area.

Remaining army bases are to be left in position:

2d Guards Mechanized Army—Furstenberg.

1st Guards Mechanized Army—Riesa.

In the aims of ensuring constant combat readiness of the troops in logistic supply, emergency supplies are to be established as follows:

- a) For ammunition: for all types of ammunition: 1.5 units of fire in divisions, 0.5 unit of fire in the army dumps, 3 units of fire in the tank troops and 1 unit of fire at the Group's dumps;
- b) For fuel and lubricants: 3.5 loads for motor vehicles including: 1 load (aside from existing) in the units, 0.5 of a load in the carriers of the rifle divisions and 2 loads at the army dumps.

For the tanks and self-propelled mounts—3 loads, including: 1.5 loads (including 1 in the vehicle tanks) in the units, 0.5 of a load in the transports of the tank divisions and mechanized divisions and 1 load at the army dumps.

For the 16th Air Army for aircraft: 5 loads at the dumps of the technical air units and at the army dumps. In

addition, for the army at the Group's dumps a reserve is to be established consisting of 5 loads of aviation gasoline.

- c) For food and fodder: in all units 5 daily rations and an emergency supply of 25 daily rations;
- d) For medical supplies: in all units according to the draft table issued by the Group's medical directorate;
- e) For veterinary supplies: to have the following set: Standard No. 2 in a regiment and Standard No. 3 in a division.

Emergency supplies are to be consumed only with the permission of the military councils of the armies and for the units of the High Command Reserve with the permission of the Group's Military Council.

8. Headquarters:

Under the conditions of the given troop grouping the headquarters of the 3d Shock and 8th Guards Armies must be located at points to the east of the main defensive zone. In the aims of operational camouflage and maintaining command of the provinces within the established administrative boundaries, the staffs of these armies are to remain on the spot.

Simultaneously, for ensuring command over the troops in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, new main command posts are to be prepared for the second defensive zone.

The main command post for the Group's Staff is to be prepared in the area of Rudersdorf (20 km to the southwest of Strausberg).

Second echelon—in the region of Falkenhagen (20 km to the northwest of Frankfurt a.d. Oder).

In addition to the main command posts, all command levels should prepare at least one alternate command post.

9. Documentation:

The plan for troop operations is to be worked out and kept only on the army staffs. These plans without fail must show:

- a) The overall plan of defense;
- b) Battle tasks for the formations of the first and second echelons and the reserves, combat arms and their cooperation between the contact line and the main defensive zone;
- c) A plan for all types of infantry, artillery and tank fire (including reinforcement artillery);

d) Diagram plan of engineer organization of terrain in the forward security zone and the main defensive zone with all calculations;

e) Organization of reconnaissance and security;

f) Antitank and air defense plan;

g) Plan for organization of signals;

h) Logistic support and organization of rear services.

The armies are to prepare special orders for the formations which will be issued with the announcing of a combat alert. The tasks set by these orders are to be practiced in the field with the commanders of the reinforcement formations and units.

The formations and units are to work out in writing only a plan for alerting the troops and bringing them to the concentration areas.

In working out these plans, they must proceed from the following time for bringing the troops to combat readiness:

- a) When the troops are warned ahead of time—1.5 hour;
- b) When the troops are not warned ahead of time—3 hours.

During the designated time all troops should be brought to full combat readiness for carrying out battle tasks. Here all the subunits, units and formations must fully have all existing weapons, transport, the standard supply of ammunition, fuels, lubricants and other types of logistic support.

The plan for the operations of the armies is to be submitted to the Group's Staff on 1 January 1947.

Appendix. Map with scale of 1:500,000.

5 November 1946

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989.

Initial Period of World War II Examined

00010008b VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 32-40

[Serialized article by Col Gen L.M. Sandalov: "They Stood to the Death"; selection from the book by L.M. Sandalov, "Boevyye deystviya voysk 4-y armii Zapadnogo fronta v nachalnyy period Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Combat Operations of the 4th Army Troops of the Western Front in the Initial Period of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1961; for earlier installments see this journal for 1988, Nos 10, 11 and 12]

[Text] During the first hours of the war the actions of the 4th Army troops, a large portion of which were caught unaware by the enemy surprise attack, were characterized by the desire to carry out the tasks set for them by

the cover plan. The army staff prior to 0500 hours, as was pointed out above, had taken measures to issue to the troops the instructions of the district command and the operational order of the army to alert all the army's units and formations.

The 6th and 42d Rifle Division under enemy blows were attempting to assemble in the assembly areas upon the alert in order to take up their defensive zones from these areas. No one had as yet a clear notion of the scope of the losses suffered during the first hours. The 75th Rifle Division began to deploy for defending its zone to the south of Brest. The 113th and 49th Rifle Divisions moved out of the areas of Semyatichy, Vysokoye, Cheremkha, Nuzhety to the northwest for taking up a line from Nur to Drogichin where, as the army staff and divisional commanders thought, they would link up with the headquarters of the II Rifle Corps of the 13th Army. The XIV Mechanized Corps had begun to concentrate according to the cover plan in the Zhabinka area. By 0900 hours, the 22d Tank Division with its forward units was approaching Zhabinka. Neither the corps commander nor the army command had any data on the losses in its units. In the Zhabinka area, the divisional chief of staff Lt Col A.S. Kisilitsyn was wounded with a shell fragment. The 30th Tank Division after the alert by 0600 hours was returning with the tank regiments from the area of the night halt after the regimental assemblies in Pruzhany and was preparing at 0700 hours to move out from Pruzhany to Zhabinka. Here they sent to the assembly area tank crews and that personnel which could be carried on the motor transport available in the division. The 205th Motorized Division by a decision of the command was not to move up into the Zhabinka area, as the available motor transport could only carry an insignificant portion of the division's personnel.

During the first hours of the war, neither the corps commanders nor the divisional commanders issued any new instructions on the procedure for the employment of the troops with a change in the tasks set by the cover plan. This was determined by the fact that the situation was unclear for everyone. In the first place, the commanders and the staffs did not have any data on the number of enemy forces and actions on the various sections of the front. Each saw only what was happening in front of him. No information was received either from above or from adjacent units. Secondly, the corps and divisional commanders, without having constant contact with the units, did not know during the first hours of the war the true losses and assumed that the units would arrive sufficiently battleworthy in the assembly areas upon the alert, while the enemy would not risk invading with large forces and would send only individual groups into our territory.

At around 0600 hours, the army staff received the first written report from the commander of the XXVIII Rifle Corps, Maj Gen V.S. Popov.

From the report the army staff learned that the corps command post at 0545 hours was in a grove 2 km to the southeast of Zhabinka. The corps commander and staff

did not know the actual situation. They reported that enemy aviation had put out of action seven aircraft from the corps aviation detachment at the airfield to the south of Vysokoye (while actually all the aircraft of the ground attack air regiment were burned up there). Nothing was said about casualties in the divisions and consequently the corps staff had no information about these. Clearly, the corps commander felt that as yet nothing serious had occurred as he ordered the commander of the 6th Rifle Division "by a brief counterstrike to drive the enemy out of Brest."

The setting of the task for a counterstrike for only the 6th Rifle Division showed the corps commander's desire to act according to the cover plan, since the 42d Rifle Division after assembly was to move up into the Semyatichy area.

Only at 0600 hours did the army command receive the order from the district: "Due to the mass military operations undertaken by the Germans, I order that the troops be alerted and act in a combat manner. Pavlov, Fominykh, Klimovskikh." But the army troops from 0400 hours had been heavily engaged. This order merely showed the ignorance of the district command of what was happening on the frontier during the first hours of the war during which the district leadership continued to be under the sway of instructions from the center: "Do not give in to a provocation." This can also explain the fact that the first announcements about the fighting on the frontier were received in the district as an armed provocation by the Germans. It was only an hour and a half later that they were convinced that a war had started.

The army command in fact also did not take any independent decisions, aside from putting the troops on combat alert, during the first hours of the war. And having ascertained that a war had started, they endeavored to carry out the decisions adopted before the plan according to the RP-4 plan and which in no way corresponded to the existing situation.

In the developing situation, it became impossible to assemble the troops in the areas set by the cover plan for their subsequent moving up to the designated defensive zones. The attempts by the troops to reach their assembly areas were unsuccessful due to the long moves during which they suffered heavy losses and for this reason it was impossible to organize a defense and put up resistance on the line of the established fortified area.

During the period from 0600 to 0700 hours, German aviation with its strikes destroyed the military compound in Kobrin and the staff of the 4th Army by 1000 hours had moved to Bukhovichi and had begun to organize troop command from the alternate command post.

Within the short period of time, the army staff did not have the opportunity to organize command and logistic support for the troops as well as provide them with real aid in air and antiaircraft artillery support for combat

activities. There was no equipment for establishing uninterrupted contact with the divisions. Communications had to be carried out only by mobile equipment through liaison officers. The data received on the troop actions and the orders issued quickly were out of date due to the abrupt changes in the situation. For organizing the operation of the rear units and facilities there were neither the personnel, the transport nor a clear understanding of how to go about organizing supply for the troops under the developing conditions. The army anti-aircraft artillery units and subunits which on the eve of the war had been in Krupki naturally could not yet arrive. The army also had no opportunity to organize air reconnaissance, a cover for the troops by fighter aviation and bombing strikes against the enemy. The fighter regiments lost virtually all their aircraft and were unable to carry out combat missions and at around 1000 hours, that is, on the very same day, the German aviation with subsequent strikes defeated also the bomber regiment of the 10th Composite Air Division at the airfield in Pinsk, having destroyed virtually all the aircraft, including the new Pe-2 bombers which had not even been fueled. Only ten SB aircraft remained in the bomber air regiment. In the second half of the day of 22 June, around a squadron of fighters (from the 33d and 123d Air Regiments) were redeployed to the Pinsk Airfield. The commander of the 10th Composite Air Division who by that time did not have communication with Pinsk, had left with his staff for Pinsk. Subsequently, the army staff did not have contact with the air division staff. The remnants of this division did not conduct any further joint actions with the army troops.

It must be pointed out that in the morning raid on Pinsk, German aviation had succeeded in destroying the fuel and lubricants dump as well as hit the district artillery dump.

By 1000 hours in the morning, a difficult situation had arisen in the army's zone but no one could properly assess and understand it. Only by 1200 hours on 22 June did the army command receive several reports on troop combat actions. But from these reports as well it was not possible to assess the developing situation.

From the reports of army staff officers returning from the divisions and from the reports of liaison officers the situation began to be somewhat clearer. It was now apparent that the enemy could not be driven out of Brest by the no longer viable 6th Rifle Division alone but also the entire XXVIII Rifle Corps.

Having received data on the situation, the army commander at approximately 1130 hours issued the following orders to the troops: the XXVIII Rifle Corps was not to permit a further enemy advance against Zhabinka. The XIV Mechanized Corps consisting of the 22d and 30th Tank Divisions concentrated in the area of Vidoml, Zhabinka, were to attack the enemy on the Brest axis together with the XXVIII Rifle Corps and the 10th Composite Air Division and restore the situation.

From the orders issued by the army commander it is clear that the situation for him and the army staff continued to remain insufficiently certain, as the army troops were given impossible tasks. In the first place, the 22d and 30th Tank Divisions had not yet concentrated in the area of Vidoml, Zhabinka and from where they were to attack the enemy. Secondly, the possibility of their combined concentration was excluded as the 22d Tank Division in retreating from Brest had been split into two parts (a portion of it retreated to Zhabinka and the other part to Radvanichi) and had suffered heavy losses. Thirdly, the XIV Mechanized Corps according to orders should have gone over to the attack together with the XXVIII Rifle Corps while the 42d Rifle Division of this corps continued to carry out the previous mission of trying to reach its defensive zone to the northwest of Brest (on the right flank of the Brest Fortified Area); the last order did not cancel this task; the 6th Rifle Division was in a difficult situation. Its units in the form of individual detachments were fighting in different areas.

At around 1100 hours, the Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, Col L.M. Sandalov, with a group of staff officers left from the new command post for Kobrin. In the town they encountered many officers and soldiers who were retreating individually and in groups from Brest and Zhabinka to the east. From the assembled officers and soldiers, upon instructions of the chief of staff, a detachment of up to two battalions in strength was organized and as reinforcements it received a battery of 45-mm guns and a tank company from the 205th Motorized Division. L.M. Sandalov appointed the Chief of the Combat Training Section of the 4th Army, Lt Col A.V. Manevich, as the detachment's commander and ordered it to take up the defensive to the west of Kobrin.

The army chief of staff gave instructions to the city military commissar in Kobrin to call up under mobilization as many ages of men as possible, to mobilize motor transport and horses and at the same time get in contact with the Brest Oblast Military Commissariat. In the event that it was impossible to establish contact with it, they were to be put under the command of the Pinsk Oblast Military Commissariat.¹ To the question of the city military commissar of what he would advise the local authorities to do, the army chief of staff pointed out that they should evacuate everything valuable to Pinsk. The army chief of staff decided not to issue instructions in retreating to destroy important civilian installations including the railroad bridges and locks on the Mukhavets River and the communications center in the town. In the second half of the day of 22 June, he turned over to the Kobrin city military commissar a district telegram for transmission to the Brest and Pinsk Oblast military commissars with the following content: "Alert assemblies for directive 008151 registered personnel, individuals, horses, mechanized transport of head dumps, all services and all fortified areas..."

In accord with the cover plan and the orders of the army commander, the divisions of the XIV Mechanized corps

continued to concentrate in the Zhabinka area. The corps commander, Maj Gen Tank Troops S.I. Oborin, reported that the 30th Tank Division by 1100 hours on 22 June 1941 was on the march to the concentration area and the column head of the main forces had reached a line of Poddubno. There was no contact with it. From the report of the liaison officer in the field, the division had one unit of fire of ammunition and one load of fuel. On the march its units had come under repeated enemy air raids. No information was received about any losses. By 1200 hours, the 22d Tank Division with heavy losses reached the concentration area: the 43d and 44th Tank Regiments in Khmelevo, Selishche, Zhabinka, Podrechye; the motorized rifle regiment by this time had concentrated in the forest to the east of Radvanichi and was putting itself in order. A very limited amount of ammunition remained in the division's units, fuel was running out (only in the vehicles), food and kitchens were lacking and there was no communications equipment.

The 205th Motorized Division, the 20th Motorcycle Regiment and the 67th Engineer Battalion were brought to combat alert in their permanent positions. One motorized rifle regiment from the division was preparing to make a night march to an area of the forests 4 km to the north of Tevli.

In the same report Gen Oborin pointed out that aside from one 5-AK radio, the corps staff did not have any communications equipment and that he was taking measures to restore order in the 22d Tank Division and establish radio contact.

The 30th Tank Division came into contact with the enemy during the period from 1200 to 1300 hours. Its forward detachment entered into battle against the enemy 18th Panzer Division in the Pilishchi area and for a certain time halted its advance. During this time to the south, in the sector of Chernavchitsy, Bol. Kurnitsa, units of the 42d Rifle Division were fighting and further south, from Cherni to the Mukhavets River, retreating units and subunits from the 6th Rifle Division.

For covering the sector to Kobrin and for eliminating the gap between the units of the 22d Tank Division which was retreating with its tank regiments to Zhabinka and with the remaining units to Radvanichi, on the line of Zhabinka, Khvedkovichi, units of the 42d Rifle Division took up the defensive. These units had been positioned to the east of Brest: the 459th Rifle Regiment (minus a battalion) and the 472d Artillery Regiment. Units from the 75th Rifle Division continued to fight to Mednaya and Chersk.

The district command, having very meager and fragmentary data on the situation, during the first half of the day of 22 June, did not make any fundamental decisions. All the orders issued by the district staff were of a particular nature and were aimed chiefly at accelerating the moving up of troops from the interior of the district. The reasons

for the ignorance of the situation were the lack of air reconnaissance and contact with clandestine intelligence, the interruption in wire communications with the troops, the inability to organize radio contact and contact by mobile facilities and aircraft with the armies which themselves did not have exhaustive data on the situation.

The morale of our troops, in addition to the first stunning enemy strikes, was negatively influenced by the disordered retreat of individuals and groups of unarmed workers and various construction subunits from the Brest Fortified Area as they spread panic and rumors about submachine gunners who had infiltrated into our rear, on dropped German assault troops, on the retreat of our troops on the flanks, on encirclement and so forth. Nevertheless, the retreating troops endeavored to grasp any more or less suitable line. But they lacked the strength and the necessary organization for a decisive rebuff of the advancing enemy and the retreat went on.

Since it was impossible to establish wire contact with the district and the corps from the army command post in Bukhovichi during the period from 1600 to 1700 hours they began to move the army staff from Bukhovichi to Zapрудy where by this time an organized new army communication center had begun operating.

In the move the army staff suffered heavy losses from enemy air strikes. The staff buses and two radios assigned to operate with the district and the air division were destroyed and many staff officers were killed and wounded.

For reporting on the situation in the army zone and for receiving information on the overall situation and instructions for further operations, at around 1600 hours, the chief of the operations department from the operations section of the army staff, Capt V.S. Makarov, was sent to the auxiliary command post (VPU) of the district staff in Obuz-Lesna. Simultaneously, the Army Signals Chief, Col A.N. Litvinenko, succeeded in establishing contact using Morse equipment with Minsk while the Army Chief of Staff, Col L.M. Sandalov, was able to talk with the front Chief of Staff,² Maj Gen V.Ye. Klimovskikh.

After reporting on the situation, the army chief of staff received instructions to take all measures to restore the situation. Maj Gen Klimovskikh also ordered that contact be established with the staff of the 10th Army, to inform the front's staff of the situation in the army's zone and inform the Commander of the 10th Army, Maj K.D. Golubev, on the reassignment of the 49th Rifle Division to him, as the headquarters of the 13th Army had not arrived on the Belsk sector of the front. The front chief of staff added that a representative of the front command would arrive at the staff of the 4th Army. During the conversations it was clear that the staff of the front knew nothing about the enemy or about the position of the 10th and 3d Armies.

It was not necessary to send a liaison officer to the 10th Army, as soon thereafter a liaison officer arrived from this army and he, to the great amazement of everyone, turned out to be the Chief of Staff of the II Rifle Corps, Col L.A. Pern, that staff which was to have under it the 49th and 113th Rifle Divisions and together with the XIII Mechanized Corps make up the 13th Army.

Col Pern announced that although the headquarters of the II Rifle Corps was in the area of Belsk, it had not received any battle tasks and had no data on the arrival of the staff of the 13th Army in Belsk.

Soon after the liaison officer from the 10th Army, at 1800 hours the Assistant District (Front) Commander for Military Schools (VUZes), Maj Gen I.N. Khabarov, arrived at the command post in Zapрудy. He presented the Commander of the 4th Army, Maj Gen A.A. Korobkov, with orders from the front staff and signed by the Front Chief of Staff, Maj Gen Klimovskikh. The order stated:

"To the commander of the 4th Army.

"The commander of the Western Special Military District has ordered: the bands which have broken through and are breaking through are to be decisively destroyed and for this use first of all Oborin's corps (XIV Mechanized Corps). In terms of actions follow the 'Red Packet.' Use aviation for joint attacks with the mechanized units. I pay exceptional attention to maintaining contact. Use radio communications, the communications of the VNOS [Air Alert] posts, liaison officers in aircraft directly to the district staff and to the nearest telegraph or telephone call exchange. Provide information every 2 hours. I assign responsibility for this to you."

Appended to the order was an excerpt from the Directive of the USSR NKO [People's Commissar of Defense] No. 2 of 22 June 1941 for a guide to action. The NKO Directive demanded: "The troops with all forces are to descend on the enemy forces and destroy them in areas where they have violated the Soviet frontier. The ground troops will not cross the frontier until a special order."

Thus, NKO Directive No. 2 issued in the morning of 22 July reached the staff of the 4th Army only at 1800 hours, approximately 11 hours later. During this time major events had occurred on the front. The German panzer divisions had already pushed 25-30 km into our territory. Our troops, particularly the 22d Tank and 6th Rifle Divisions had suffered heavy losses in personnel and combat equipment. Just several aircraft remained in the 10th Composite Air Division.

Naturally, the demands of both the NKO Directive as well as the orders from the front staff no longer corresponded to the existing situation. Nevertheless, on the basis of these demands the army staff immediately compiled an operational order. According to the draft order initially the 205th Motorized Division was not to

be part of the assault grouping but was to remain on the spot and continue preparing defenses on the line of the Mukhavets River and in the region of Bereza-Kartuzskaya. However, the army commander, in following the instructions of the front staff, that is, to be guided in his actions by the "Red Packet," the cover plan, ordered that this division be included for a counterstrike, regardless of the arguments by the army staff that according to the figures the division would be able to move only an insignificant portion of its strength by the available motor transport to the Zhabinka area.

The army commander, in truth, endeavored to learn the opinion of Gen Khabarov on this question, as he was the representative of the front staff, but to this he received the reply: "You can see better."

The army Military Council Member, Div Commissar F.I. Shlykov who had arrived at this time from Brest where the war had caught him also did not support the staff and as a result the Operational Order No. 02 issued to the army at 1830 hours on 22 June 1941, set the following tasks for 23 June:

"The troops of the 4th Army, in continuing a firm defense of the occupied lines during the night, from the morning of 23 June 41 are to go over to an offensive around Brest to the north with the task of destroying the enemy which has crossed the Western Bug River. The strike is to be launched by the XIV Mechanized Corps together with the XVIII Rifle Corps and by the high-speed bomber air regiment from the 10th Composite Air Division. The 75th and 49th Rifle Divisions are to continue holding the occupied lines.

"The XIV Mechanized Corps (22d, 30th Tank and 205th Motorized Divisions) from the morning of 23 June 41 are to launch a thrust from the line of Krivlyany, Pilishchi, Khmelevo on the general axis of Vysokoye with the task by the end of the day of destroying the enemy to the east of the Western Bug River. The 30th Tank Division is to be on the right, enveloping flank and the 205th Motorized Division for exploiting the success and covering the right flank. The tank attack is to be supported by the bomber air regiment from the 10th Composite Air Division.

"The XVIII Rifle Corps is to launch a thrust with its right flank (6th, 42d Rifle Divisions and a battalion of tanks from the 205th Motorized Division) on the general axis of Brest, having the task of taking Brest by the end of the day.

"The attack is to commence at 0500 hours on 23 June 41 after 15-minute artillery strike.

"Frontier is not to be crossed before receiving special order."

The order said nothing about the enemy as the army staff had received no data about it either from its own troops.

from the aviation or from the front staff. The order did not give the troops also any instructions on the questions of rear services.

After drawing up the order, Gen Khabarov informed the army command that today Lt Gen I.V. Boldin would fly out to the 10th Army for leading the horse-mechanized group. This group, together with the 3d Army, was to launch a strike against the enemy on the Grodno axis. At the same time, the army staff received information that the headquarters of the 13th Army was moving not to Belsk but to Novogradok.

Consequently, in terms of appearances everything seemed good. The order was issued to the troops. Preparations for the forthcoming actions should get underway and in the morning we would launch a retaliatory strike against the enemy.

However, the situation which was developing extremely unfavorably for the Soviet troops demanded different solutions and different instructions to the troops in order to prevent the approaching disaster.

By the end of 22 June, neither the front staff nor the army staff had any complete data on the enemy and our own troops. Even the formation commanders did not know the actual position of the units and the amounts of losses suffered by them.

The situation which existed in the army zone by the end of the first day of the war could be established only after the war by studying the surviving portion of the troop and army documents, the memoirs of the participants in the events and captured documents. It can be described in the following manner.

The troops of the 4th Army by the end of 22 June 1941 had been pushed back 25-30 km from the state frontier under the enemy attacks. The forward units of the 18th German Panzer Division had broken deep into our territory, almost 40 km on the Pruzhany axis.

The 30th Tank Division was fighting on a line of Pilishchi, Podlesye and with a portion of the forces to the north of Rataychitsy against the 18th and 17th Panzer Divisions of the XLVII Motorized Corps.

The 22d Tank Division was putting in order the tank and motorized subunits which were concentrated in an area to the north of Zhabinka; with a portion of the forces from the motorized and artillery regiments it was fighting on the line of Rakitnitsa, Radvanichi against units of the 3d Panzer Division of the XIV German Motorized Corps, supporting the collection of on-foot³ subunits from its division to the east of this line.

The 205th Motorized Division for the defensive had occupied the line along the Mukhavets River from Pruzhany to Zaprudye; the on-foot subunits from the division and a combat engineer battalion from the XIV

Mechanized Corps were preparing the defensive for the area of Bereza-Kartuzskaya.

The staff of the XIV Mechanized Corps as before was in the Tevli area and the motorcycle regiment in Drogichin.

The corps tank divisions began preparing to launch the counterstrike at dawn of 23 June.

The 42d Rifle Division was checking units of the 31st German Infantry Division on the approaches to Zhabinka.

Units from the 6th Rifle Division together with the 459th Rifle Regiment of the 42d Division were fighting in the Khevkovich area against units from the 3d Panzer and 34th Infantry German Divisions.

The garrison remaining in the Brest Fortress and consisting of subunits from the 6th and 42d Rifle Divisions was fighting heavily against the 45th Infantry Division and other units from the enemy XII Army Corps.

The staff of the XXVIII Rifle Corps moved to the area of Kobrin. The corps began preparations for participating on 23 June in the counterstrike together with the tank divisions from the XIV Mechanized Corps and in the event of success for an offensive with them against Brest.

The 75th Rifle Division was fighting on the line of Pozhezhin, Malorita, Khotslav against the German 4th Panzer, 1st Cavalry and 255th Infantry Divisions.

The 15th Rifle and 31st Artillery Regiments from the 49th Division were checking the enemy advance on the line of Verpol, Tokary. The rest of the division's forces were continuing to move up to the northwest. Here the 212th Rifle and 166 Howitzer Regiments, in following the route of Nuzhets, Semyatich, Tsekhanovets, collided with the enemy some 25-30 km to the west of Nuzhets and deployed for combat without having contact either with the adjacent units or with the division's staff. The 222d Rifle Regiment was approaching the forests to the north of Semyatich.⁴

Due to the fact that the 49th Rifle Division was moving out of its area to the northwest, the enemy almost unobstructed began to advance on the axis of Vysokoye and Nuzhets, enveloping the 15th Rifle Regiment on both flanks. By the end of the day, as was pointed out in the Operational Summary of Army Group Center for 22 June, the forward units of the 134th German Infantry Division had reached the approaches to Vysokoye while those of the 252d Infantry Division were approaching the forests to the south of Nuzhets.

A large portion of the personnel from the 17th Machine Gun-Artillery Battalion was retreating from the area of Volchin in the direction of Vysokoye where the staff of the 62d Fortified Area was located.³ Several subunits from this battalion continued to fight heroically in an encirclement in the permanent fire emplacements held by them to the south of Volchin. A small group of personnel from the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Battalion was retreating in this same direction from the Brest area. The 16th Machine Gun Artillery Battalion from the 62d Fortified Area, according to the data of the Operational Summary of the 4th German Army for 22 June, successfully repulsed an offensive by flanking units from the enemy's 292d and 252d Infantry Divisions.

The detachment of Lt Col A.V. Manevich consisting of two battalions was preparing the defenses on the western outskirts of Kobrin.

The remnants of the 10th Composite Air Division together with the staff were in Pinsk. The division was out of contact with the army staff.

The Pinsk Naval Flotilla with its forward detachment had reached the area of Kobrin, but it did not establish contact either with the army staff or with the formations of the XXVIII Rifle Corps.

The headquarters of the Kobrin Brigade Air Defense Region together with the remnants of the 218th Air Defense Battalion had moved to Bereza-Kartuzskaya.

The staff of the 4th Army was in Zapрудy.

Units from the 6th and 42d Rifle Divisions of the XXVIII Rifle Corps as well as the 22d Tank Division were operating in several isolated groups which were out of contact with one another. The main forces of the 6th Rifle Division headed by the division's commander, M.A. Popsuy-Shapko, his deputy for political affairs and the chief of staff as well as two commanders of rifle regiments were on the above-indicated line. A second group of troops from this division under the command of the deputy divisional commander Col F.A. Ostashenko had been assembled to the north of Zhabinka in the area of concentration of the 22d Tank Division. In it were several subunits of the 6th and 42d Rifle Divisions which had retreated from the areas of defensive works on the frontier, a part of the 125th Rifle Regiment (the regimental school, the remnants of one battalion and a special subunit) and a part of the subunits from the 447th Corps Artillery Regiment.⁶ A third group of the 6th Rifle Division consisting of subunits from the 84th Rifle and 204th Howitzer Regiments was together with a motorized rifle regiment and the on-foot subunits of the 22d Tank Division in the area of Radvanichi and linked up with the main forces only in the morning of 23 June at Kobrin. Moreover, a part of the division remained in the Brest Fortress.

Units from the 42d Rifle Division which had retreated from Brest occupied a line on the approaches to Zhabinka while the 459th Rifle and 472d Artillery Regiments in a way connected the isolated units of the 22d Tank Division in the sector of Zhabinka, Khvedkovichi.

During the night the army troops were to resupply with ammunition, fuel and food, evacuate wounded to the rear and prepare for the counterstrike. The fuel and food supplies for the 22d Tank Division and the divisions of the XXVIII Rifle Corps were to be secured from supplies at dumps in Kobrin, while ammunition was to come from the dump of the 205th Motorized Division. Here the 22d Tank Division would receive the tank trucks and kitchens of the 205th Motorized Division.

As a consequence of the fact that very little transport remained in the divisions and units of the XXVIII Corps and there was no corps and army motor transport, the troops received less than a day's supply of fuel and food. Since both district artillery dumps were destroyed, the army had nowhere to obtain shells and cartridges. The army units and formations did not have medical evacuation equipment as it was planned that this was to be received upon mobilization, and for this reason it was impossible to organize the planned evacuation of sick and wounded. They also could not count on 23 June on the participation of aviation in joint operations against the ground troops, for air reconnaissance and for providing an air cover.

All of this taken together provided virtually no chance for success of the army thrust which was to come on the morning of 23 June.

However, neither the army commander, the army staff nor the corps commanders raised the question to the front's staff of the inadvisability of carrying out the counterstrike and made no proposal to go over to the defensive.

Divisions from the II and XLIV Rifle Corps continued to arrive in the Minsk area.

The front's staff remained in Minsk while the front's VPU headed by the deputy commander, the chief of the operations section and the signals chief of the front was in Obuz-Lesna. On the first day of the war it was not possible to organize troop command from the front's VPU and leadership over the troops was not provided. The VPU did not have contact with the armies. The contact of the front staff with the 4th Army by the end of the day had also been broken. The representative of the 4th Army, Capt Makarov, who arrived at the VPU at the end of the day, received neither information about the situation nor instructions on the further actions of the army.

Footnotes

1. After the war it was learned that the Brest Oblast Military Commissar, Maj V.M. Stafeyev, with a group of his officers and several-score party and soviet workers

from Brest until evening defended themselves in the building of the oblast military commissariat and all perished.—Author's Note.

2. The Headquarters of the Western Special Military District on the first day of the war was turned into the Headquarters of the Western Front.—Author's Note.

3. Here and in certain other parts of the book, the author uses the word "on-foot" subunits and units. We have in mind our motorized rifle and tank subunits which had lost their tanks and motor vehicles or did not have tank units and fought as infantry, so to speak, on foot.—Author's Note.

4. From the memoirs of the former Chief of Staff of the 49th Rifle Division, Maj S.I. Gurov, and the former Commander of the 212th Rifle Regiment of this division, Maj N.I. Kovalenko.

5. From the memoirs of the former Deputy Chief of the Political Section of the 62d Fortified Area, Sr Btl Commissar F.L. Kokin.

6. From the memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union, Lt Gen F.A. Ostashenko.

(To Be Continued)

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989.

Lobov on Development of Strategy in 20's, 30's
00010008c Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY
ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press
25 Jan 89) pp 41-50

[Article, published under the heading "Military Science: People and Problems," by Col Gen V.N. Lobov: "Timely Questions in the Development of the Theory of Soviet Military Strategy in the 1920's to the Mid-1930's"]

[Text] The Soviet theory of strategy, in being founded on Marxist-Leninist teachings and in drawing on the rich military experience of the past, developed with unusual strength in the 1920's. The period of the 1920's and the start of the 1930's represented the establishing of the Soviet theory of strategy. At this time the foundation was laid for the development of Soviet strategic thought and the areas were designated for its subsequent development and advance.

The 20's and the beginning of the 30's are of particular significance in the history of the development of our military theory. Precisely during these years, its methodological bases were established, content was defined and the first Soviet military scientific personnel was created. This period was marked by a diversity of military strategic research, by a boldness of conclusions and generalizations, by high professionalism and content on the part of the authors of the military scientific works. A characteristic trait of those times was the stormy military

theoretical debates the predominant theme of which was the questions of the development of strategy. This was, as the documents of those times show, a free exchange of opinions marked by a depth of judgments, by freedom of thought, and by a reticence to claim absolute truth and this, as was pointed out by the former participants of these debates, "was no longer to be found in any stage of the subsequent development of Soviet military theory."¹

The period of the 1920's up to the mid-1930's provides a vivid picture of extensive research work, broad creative thinking and important principled decisions on elaborating the questions of the development of the theory of strategy. Without this period, it would be impossible to imagine the further development of Soviet military theory.

The history of Soviet military thought, unfortunately, has still not been given a complete treatment in our military science. At the same time, precisely the study of the history of military thought helps us seek out and find answers to the most crucial questions of military theory. Without a knowledge of the historical roots and without knowing that situation in which one or another theoretical concept was formed, it is hard at times to foresee its correct further development. It is generally recognized that the basis for the elaboration of major military theoretical problems the importance of which is extremely significant now was established in the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's. All of this applies fully to the Soviet theory of strategy.

History was to develop in such a manner that many strategic views on the part of Soviet military theorists have reclaimed a right to existence only after scores of years. In this context, it is extremely important to refer as often as possible to the sources of the development of our military science.

Since research on the strategic views of the prominent military leaders and military theorists in the 20's and 30's is a separate independent subject, within the context of the given article I would like to take up a review of certain publications and manuscripts which up to the present have been little known or unknown for the reader.

Of great interest is the previously unpublished work of B.M. Shaposhnikov "Abris sovremennoy strategii" [Outline of Modern Strategy]. Written in 1923, it is a critical analysis of the then known lectures on strategy by A.M. Zayonchkovskiy. The basic provisions of this work make it possible more clearly to understand the content of the debates over strategy and where B.M. Shaposhnikov was an active participant.

The author of the "Abris," having posed the question of on what material one should construct a strategy of the future, said: "...We have considered it a profound error to base conclusions on a future strategy on 'the times of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea,' in avoiding

the harsh judgments of Clausewitz who felt such excursions into the area of ancient history to be 'patterned patches superimposed on scandalous tears' and the absence 'in a majority of an honest desire to persuade and instruct'."

This methodological provision proposed by B.M. Shaposhnikov is extremely pertinent as it shows that the initial historical material which forms strategy ultimately is constantly in development and changing and that it will lead unconditionally to changes in strategic views.

A particular subject of the "Abris" was the problem of the relationship between policy and strategy. The polemical nature of the work and the broad scope of the subject as proposed by A.M. Zayonchkovskiy in his lectures made it possible to B.M. Shaposhnikov to examine the relationship of policy and strategy from different, at times unexpected, aspects. In correcting Zayonchkovskiy who did not always consistently carry out the notion of the primacy of policy in relation to strategy, B.M. Shaposhnikov reaches extensive conclusions and generalizations.

Like A.M. Zayonchkovskiy, the author of the "Abris" considers it valid to divide the process of "preparation" for a war into the "strategy of the state" and the "strategy of the command," and the latter, undoubtedly, is subordinate to the former. He emphasizes that in the period of preparing for a war, the relationship of policy and strategy "must be spoken of first of all."

In the opinion of B.M. Shaposhnikov, the basis of everything should be the "war plan" understood in the broad sense as the state's preparations for a war in all regards. "The essence of a modern war plan," he said, "consists precisely in drawing up the views on the conduct of the war as a whole and a portion of which comprises the indispensable work of the High Command."

Here it is wise to emphasize that B.M. Shaposhnikov was against dividing the political and military aspects of a war plan. He felt that work on such a plan was a task for both the politicians and the military. The integration of political and military vision into unified strategic views—this is what B.M. Shaposhnikov demanded from the military, in emphasizing that "a military leader should be a state figure and not merely an adviser on military affairs." At the same time, he did not see any particular advantages of the strategist over the politician and pointed out that "the best conclusion is a harmony of work and not the passing from hand to hand of one or another question of the war."

Shaposhnikov was an active supporter of the notion that "preparation for a war is a concern of the entire state." Here a particular role is assigned to the strategist. "It seems to us," he emphasized, "that the activities of a strategist should be aimed at daily intervention into the work of the remaining state bodies, being concerned with one high goal of ensuring readiness for the war."

One of the most important tasks for the strategist, in the opinion of B.M. Shaposhnikov, is involvement in establishing the optimum sizes of a state's armed forces in peacetime. Shaposhnikov felt that the basis of such a choice and justification should be "goals of an international nature" and the international situation. In developing his views on this question, the author favored a militia type army, feeling that "in our days militia armies should be considered by us as a permanent factor in a future conflict and should not be an exception and an indication of the state's weakness."

In relying on an analysis of historical patterns, Shaposhnikov critically assessed the views of A.M. Zayonchkovskiy concerning the relationship of a "offensive strategy" and a "defensive strategy." The author of the "Abris" pointed out that "policy should unconditionally influence the nature of a war, making it either offensive or defensive." This viewpoint by Shaposhnikov is fundamental to the harsh criticism which B.M. Shaposhnikov subjected to the views of A.M. Zayonchkovskiy concerning the primacy of the offensive over the defensive as Zayonchkovskiy felt that "an offensive strategy is a natural type of military art as it corresponds to the nature of war."

In contradistinction to A.M. Zayonchkovskiy, the author of the "Abris" did not absolutize the offensive, seeing not only its positive aspects but also the negative ones. B.M. Shaposhnikov felt that there could be neither a pure offensive or a pure defensive. He emphasized that "in a war, the offensive and defensive are intertwined and it is impossible to recommend only an offensive and may even be harmful." Here the critics shared the viewpoint of A.A. Svechin that "a defensive is a very strong form of waging war." B.M. Shaposhnikov advised the author "to gain a good feeling for this and with the light touch of a Suvorov not to label in our days the defensive as 'false' and 'eradicate the spirit of the defensive' from the Red Army."

Judging from the examined work, B.M. Shaposhnikov in the debate on the offensive and defensive held a centrist position, rejecting equally extreme viewpoints, although he was inclined in favor of the defensive. As a whole, his view on this problem is clearly illustrated by his own words that he considers "one strategy essential and that is the 'strategy of common sense' which is of 'two types,' a military-political offensive and a military-political defensive."

It is very indicative that B.M. Shaposhnikov was against any strategic routines or "systems" of strategy. He emphasized that "there are not different 'systems' of strategy which could be recommended for the conduct of a war, but each military leader, in studying the essence of a war and in comprehending its development in his contemporary age, works out his own 'beat' as a result of his practical and scientific work."

An examination of the strategic views of B.M. Shaposhnikov can be continued from the example of a critical

analysis made by him of the report of A.A. Svechin "Budushchaya voyna" [Future War]. Addressed to the people's commissar of defense, the report by the professor of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] Military Academy raised very important theoretical and practical questions of strategy: concerning the nature of a future war, concerning the make-up of the coalition opposing the USSR and concerning the tasks of the Red Army in the first operations of the war. In our view, from these and other questions raised by A.A. Svechin and B.M. Shaposhnikov, it is wise to point out the most pertinent ones.

First of all, A.A. Svechin raised the question of the underestimation of a strategic defensive which was indispensable for the Red Army given the coalition war against the USSR. The view of Prof Svechin came down to the fact that a strategic offensive on one sector of the front should be supported by a defensive on the remainder. "The disdain for the defensive noted in the Red Army," writes A.A. Svechin, "is based upon a miscomprehension of the dialectical link between them: the one who is unable to defend itself will also be unable to advance."

B.M. Shaposhnikov recognizes the valid criticism of A.A. Svechin, emphasizing: "It must not be concealed that in recognizing the defensive as an equal type of action with the offensive, we are moving along a slow evolutionary path. The defensive is more difficult than the offensive and our units do not do well on the defensive." At the same time, the chief of the RKKA Staff felt that "revolutionary armies in the course of history have always advanced better than defending themselves" and for this reason "it is essential to consider the essence of the Red Army and not deprive it of its spirit."

The political subtext of the ideas of B.M. Shaposhnikov concerning strategy is even more vividly, in our view, reflected in that portion of his critical review where he accuses A.A. Svechin of adhering to a "strategy of attrition, a strategy with limited goals, a strategy of major paths to the goal." Soviet authors on the problems of strategy have repeatedly turned to the debates of the 20's and 30's on the strategy of attrition and the strategy of active defeat. Nevertheless, we feel that the form of this debate did not always make it possible to examine its content completely and thoroughly.

In agreeing that a future war would be a coalition one, A.A. Svechin and B.M. Shaposhnikov, regardless of the fact that they were adherents of different strategic views, felt that the USSR could sustain a victory in such a war only by an offensive. However, they conceived of the goal of the offensive differently. Thus, A.A. Svechin felt that "the task of Red strategy in the initial period of a war consists in picking out the weakest point in the system of the configuration of enemy fronts, to achieve a dependable and major success and quickly regain the freedom of maneuver of the main forces." Here the

enemy's main forces must be tied down by a defensive and, having ground them down and bled them white and having seized the initiative, to go over to the offensive and bring about the final rout.

Conversely, B.M. Shaposhnikov proved that "a war must commence with the defeat of the strongest and most dangerous enemy and not be diverted by successes over a weak one leaving the stronger to hang over one's neck." In the line of argument of B.M. Shaposhnikov, in addition to the strictly military considerations, political ones are also present. He wrote: "It must not be forgotten that for the resolution of a war, it is important to have not only military successes but also obtain a political success, that is, win a victory over a politically important enemy.... Otherwise, only after an extended period accompanied even by military successes, we will be forced to return to the same fight against the main enemy against which we initially were only on the defensive."

As is seen from the given viewpoints, the essence of the debate over a strategy of attrition and a strategy of active defeat was somewhat more complicated than is usually felt. It is also understandable that this debate had not so much a speculative as a practical nature.

The views voiced by A.A. Svechin about strategy in the report also concerned the qualitative aspect of military organizational development. "Under our conditions," said Svechin turning to the people's commissar of defense, "we must give a significant advantage to a reliance on quality over quantity; a reliance on quantity is a reliance on a positional and not a maneuvering war.... This is the best method of devastating a state." Svechin's definition of the qualitative parameters is extremely timely now, when a search is underway for new approaches to the problems of defense organizational development.

The constructiveness of the strategic views of the prominent military scientist A.A. Svechin has not lost its importance and many of them have been confirmed by practice. In this regard, we must particularly emphasize his support of the idea of a pluralism of opinions on the questions of military art; he was categorically against "sealing the lips of any critic."

Clearly, B.M. Shaposhnikov shared the same approach of A.A. Svechin. He felt that regardless of the insufficiency of information available to military thinkers and the thus inevitable errors, "all the same, it is not only interesting but even essential to listen to their arguments as the expression of the opinion of 'fresh' persons, that is, sitting in a permanent job and more quickly noting various errors."

As a whole, an analysis of the unique material found in the unpublished works of B.M. Shaposhnikov and A.A. Svechin makes it possible to bring out new features in the strategic views of these military leaders and to

properly assess the breadth of view and the depth of their judgments on a number of problems which have not lost their timeliness even now.

Of course, it would be erroneous to feel that a judgment on strategic questions was a privilege of only the prominent figures; on the contrary, without a broad exchange of opinions among the professionals there judgments could not have been crystallized so vividly and clearly.

Many works on strategy by researchers in the 1920's and up to the mid-1930's, it is to be greatly regretted, continue to remain unknown to the readers. The given article will examine only certain of these. Certainly this question requires a separate study and in the given instance one can only outline broadly that contribution which the authors of these military scientific works made to studying the theory of strategy.

The well-known Soviet military theorist A.A. Neznamov repeatedly turned to the problems of strategy. Among such works is his article in which the strategic importance of modern equipment is examined.

In researching the question of the impact of new combat equipment on the nature of conducting combat, the author emphasizes that each appearance of a "innovation" plays a definite role "but in combination with others may require serious reforms, sometimes in areas not directly related to it."

In speaking about the strategic importance of equipment, Neznamov particularly stressed that "equipment is capable to an enormous degree of increasing the combat energy of the live element but by itself without this element cannot be of benefit." In this regard, for achieving a strategic success, in the author's opinion, there must be the strictly advisable involvement of equipment and the limits of this involvement "can be determined only by a true military man."

The author offered his own definition of strategic surprise, "that is, surprise against which there is no means for establishing a sufficient counteraction in a short period of time. Much time will pass until such counteraction can be organized (built) and during this time initiative to a certain degree will shift to the enemy side."

The secret of the art which provides serious advantages to the process of creating strategic surprise consists, in Neznamov's opinion, "in the prompt recognition and prompt 'adaptation' to technical 'innovations'."

The article by N. Lyamin "Defeat and Attrition" published in the journal *ARMIYA I REVOLYUTSIYA* (No 1, 1926) provides a detailed analysis of the views of military authorities of the 16th-19th Centuries on the forms and methods of waging war. The author distinguishes the two leading trends: "a war of defeat" and "a war of exhaustion (attrition)."

In tracing the history of wars, the author notes the consistent change in the methods of waging war: either the method of defeat or the method of wearing down the enemy forces. "The strategy of a modern war," the author concludes, "is becoming evermore flexible, more dialectical and variable. The method of waging war does not remain unchanged over the entire war but rather undergoes a number of changes which are felt in the scale of the individual campaigns and even in the process of conducting individual operations. The method of how to wage a war—by the method of defeat or by the method of wearing down the enemy—is of profound practical importance. A correct solution to this question before the start of a war will determine the carrying out of measures in the area of organizing the armed forces, developing industry and the railroads, education and training of the army. All strategy, tactics and their calculations with these two completely different methods of waging war also differ. It would be absurd for the just voiced reasons to view the conduct of an entire war as a whole following one of these two methods. Clearly, the most farsighted politician and strategist will be unable to anticipate the entire course of a war. He can make his plans only for the first period in relying on the methods of conducting operations which get underway directly after the start of the war."

N. Lyamin particularly emphasized that there is confusion in the definition and content invested in the notion of attrition. In the author's opinion, the notion of attrition must not be identified with the concept of the defensive. It is all the most unacceptable to confuse the concept of a strategic offensive or defensive with the concept of the defensive and offensive in the historical political sense. Characteristic is a statement by Zinovyev which the author gives in his article: "We should precisely distinguish between an offensive and defensive war in the historical, concrete sense and a defensive and offensive war in the diplomatic and strategic sense. A parallelism between either is in no way obligatory. There are possible instances when a war which is defensive in the historical sense is offensive in the strategic sense and vice versa...."

"A state wages an offensive war when by this war it defends a policy impeding historical progress. A state conducts a defensive war when in the arrangement of things it defends or protects historical progress.... In the age of imperialist wars, in the age of wars conducted at the higher stage, with maximum maturity of capitalism, a defensive war can be waged only by a victorious socialist state against a capitalist, imperialist state."²

N. Lyamin arrives at a conclusion on the probability of "future wars, and particularly their first part in a style of attrition." "If we are forced to fight in the near future," he pointed out, "then the first period of the war, up until the completion of economic mobilization and the full deployment of the Red Army, until the increase in the revolutionary movement in the enemy and the exhaustion of its moral and physical forces, we will be forced to conduct following the method of attrition."

The article of A. Zayonchkovskiy "The Democratization of Strategy"³ is devoted to the noble task of popularizing the study of strategy. The essence of a modern war demands from the commanders, in the authors opinion, strategic knowledge. Questions of a strategic nature more and more are part of the daily work "not only of wartime but also peacetime, if strategy is given a broader interpretation in the sense of preparing the military might of a people."

"The sphere or radius of activity of a general and a commander of a middle-level troop formation are very different," Zayonchkovskiy emphasized, "but they should both be to greater or lesser degree strategists. In modern armies strategic art should move down from the superior staffs to the small cells of the line units, it is to be democratized and without fail should be among those books with which the line commanders are familiar."

In briefly setting out the main provisions of the strategic views among the prominent military figures of the past, A. Zayonchkovskiy pointed out that "a majority of writers give strategy a vital, practical character and consequently for this reason is within the reach of all the commanders who have obtained at least the military theoretical and practical training which provides them with an understanding of the individual elements of military affairs and the possibility of consciously investigating their aggregate employment in a war."

A. Zayonchkovskiy was against the blind following of the prescribed standards and routine in military art. "Grief will befall that army," the author of the article pointed out, "in which the command in all its mass does not abandon this alpha and omega of their predecessors. Command personnel educated solely in employing a prescribed standard in tactics, the letter of the order in training and routine and cramming in education should not have a place in the wars of the near future. At present, each tactician should be to a greater or lesser degree a strategist, so complex have our military affairs become and so greatly the intertwined conglomerate of all elements of a war has grown and without being limited to just the top of the troop mass, this has now permeated the entire body in all the diversity of combat life."

A most important feature, in the opinion of Zayonchkovskiy was the fact that the showing of independence and initiative as an essential component confronted the commanders. All of this "involves the entire mass of commanders in the strategic art." By independence Zayonchkovskiy understood the independent choice of the means for carrying out the set task. By initiative the manifesting of independent creativity by subordinates in a spirit of the better execution of the main idea of a senior chief.

In the view of Zayonchkovskiy, the senior chiefs should turn over a portion of their authority to the junior ones while the juniors should be included in the circle of thinking of the senior. The democratization of strategic

art at the current stage consists in the fact, the author emphasizes, that life itself dictates the necessity for each commander "to become utterly absorbed in the strategic area." "A regimental commander and all the more a commander of a division and higher," Zayonchkovskiy feels, "works in such an expanse that the sphere of activity involuntarily departs from the narrow battlefield and moves into the sphere of strategic combinations.... On the one hand, the area of work of each troop organism and, consequently, its commander has been broadened; on the other hand, its work is narrowed by the necessity of being a small part in a very large troop mechanism extending over a great distance but at the same time carrying out one common main idea which in addition requires constant mutual aid and unity in work. The entire difficulty in a modern situation is that the parts of the complex machine of a modern army are put into motion not mechanically but rather with the aid of great knowledge and ability which drive them and which, moreover, should be created by a uniformity of approach to one's work and to the methods of thinking."

All of this is achieved solely due to the extensive knowledge of command personnel in the area of strategy. For precisely this reason, the article's author recognizes the "democratization of strategic art" as an urgent necessity.

Important questions linked with a definition of the concept of strategy and its particular features in coalition-type wars were raised in the article "Strategic Reserves" by A.D. Shimanskiy. In analyzing the experience of World War I, he arrives at the notion that the strategic concepts of future wars inevitably will take into account the multinational, international nature of the opposing sides. In the notion of A.D. Shimanskiy, strategy in a modern war represents for the state and its armed forces a combination of a strategy for fighting as part of a coalition grouping or the "strategy of internal operational lines" and a strategy of fighting against coalition groups or the "strategy of external operational lines."

Of interest is the notion of A.D. Shimanskiy of the need to mobilize all the state's forces in a war even against a weak enemy. Strategy, as the author feels, must immediately alert "forces readied by policy" and deploy them in the theater of war. Otherwise, Shimanskiy feels, "they (the forces) must be strengthened by waves of reinforcements."

The author gives a great deal of attention to the question of strategic reserves which in the 1920's had been little worked on. A.D. Shimanskiy assumed that strategy should "divide its forces not evenly along the fronts and their operations but rather proportionately to the relative importance of them." Here he pointed to the necessity of creating strategic reserves or "a reserve common to all the fronts" and which, in using the words of the author, "would not delay, would not dawdle in idleness, and wander aimlessly." The ideas of A.D. Shimanskiy on the need for a strategic reserve of several fronts completely justified themselves in the course of the Great Patriotic War when a strategic reserve of the fronts was

established (for example, the Steppe Military District formed in the course of preparing for the Kursk Battle in 1943).

In his work, A.D. Shimanskiy also devoted significant attention to the question of the battle task of the strategic reserve, to the forms of its maneuvering in strategic offensive and defensive operations and so forth. In speaking about the composition of strategic reserves, the author isolated two elements which form them. He considered in these, in the first place, "all the combat reserves of the state which had not yet been alerted or still not deployed in the theater of war but capable within a stipulated time (or times) of taking their place as strategic reserves" and, secondly, the portion of forces which strategy leaves for itself from among those forces deployed in the theater of war...." The composition of the strategic reserve is determined "by the aim, axis and urgency of the same operation."

The new aspects in developing the idea of strategic reserves in a modern war underwent severe testing in the course of the Great Patriotic War and showed their viability.

In briefly summing up the review of certain problems in the development of the theory of strategy as touched upon by authors of military scientific works in the 1920's and 1930's, we must first of all mention their timeliness and the original judgments on the proposed ways of solving. The innovative nature of many of them reflected not only the indefatigable scientific search of the military theorists and practical workers and not only synthesized previous experience, but for many years to come defined the ways for the development of Soviet military affairs.

Along with the interesting scientific views among the military theorists of those times, from the standpoint of today there is also particular pertinence in that level of democracy, scientific competitiveness and pluralism of opinions which was characteristic of the situation of those times and which, undoubtedly, contributed to the flight of military strategic thought and was a manifestation of the authentic democracy in the development of Soviet military science.

In the second half of the 1930's, the development of Soviet military theory and particularly the theory of strategy went on in an extremely difficult situation. On the one hand, there was the growing threat of a new world war as well as military conflicts in various parts of the world and, on the other, the harsh testings which befell the Red Army under the influence of the consequences of the cult of Stalin's personality.

In the second half of the 1930's, the attitude toward studying the theory of strategy became worse and worse. Thus, in 1935, at the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze, the curriculum of the military history faculty provided a 32-hour series of lectures on the theory of strategy, however during the year that the faculty existed,

not a single lecture was given. With the establishing of the General Staff Academy in 1936, a course on strategy was not even part of its program. Representatives of the superior command, as G.S. Isserson has recalled, avoided giving lectures on strategic questions (with the exception of Tukhachevskiy who gave one at the start of 1937 on general problems of modern warfare).⁴ More and more the questions of strategy were considered the prerogative of the superior leadership in the person of I.V. Stalin. Even the slightest hint of the need to investigate the questions of the theory of strategy collided with a blank wall. The unjustified repressions to which the already small group of military leaders and theorists working on the theory of strategy was subjected to halted the development of strategic theory. Many interesting concepts and ideas voiced in the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's were declared to be alien and wrecking.

The consequences of such an attitude toward the development of the theory of strategy, as is known, were fatal for the start of the war in 1941. The certain confusion and the inability to encompass the complex situation as a whole, to take an effective large-scale decision and subordinate to it the entire course of events to a significant degree were the result of the lack of strategic orientation and the unpreparedness to think in large categories of strategic significance...." recalled G. Isserson. "The rapid change of mind on the part of the military command which had already entered a mortal engagement with the attacking enemy was not backed up by the instilling of flexible thinking which was not subordinate to any declarations and was free in taking quick decisions, as was considered essential under the arising conditions. This was precisely the reason that the command of the hither formations at the outset of the war did not gain from our progressive military theory that benefit which it could have provided."⁵

According to the information of G. Isserson, the decline in debates on the questions of the theory of military strategy in a definite sense told negatively on the development of a new area of military affairs, operational art, and here Soviet military theory had primacy in its development. As G. Isserson has written, "our operational art to a certain degree was contained in its own limits while the strategic sphere of the war remained, unfortunately, basically outside the research of military theory."

It can be said with a certain degree of confidence that the essence of the gap between the theories of operational art and strategy was that the latter dictated the initial premises to operational art, demanding from it completely definite conclusions; the reverse effect was minimal. "We were bound by definite concepts of a declarative nature concerning the offensive conduct of a war," confided G. Isserson, "that our army would be the most aggressive army; that we would shift military operations into enemy territory and so forth and so forth. These ideas were handed down from above as unquestionable guiding directives for our military policy and formed the

basis of all the military thinking of the command personnel. During the period of Stalin's cult of personality, they assumed the importance of a law and could not be discussed in theory."

Thus, the studies by the General Staff Academy on the question "The Army on the Defensive" remained completely unnoticed. Done in 1938 for the first time "in all the history of the Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and the General Staff Academy," this work did not gain appropriate recognition. Unfortunately, the opinion imposed from above on the superiority of the offensive over the defensive was an insurmountable obstacle for analyzing the results of the academy's work. The dialectics of the relationship between the defensive and offensive as recognized in words was not considered in practice, although this dialectic rests on the surface. "It is possible to adhere to an offensive doctrine," wrote G. Isserson, "and have a theoretically well elaborated defensive. On the contrary, it is possible to actually adhere to a defensive doctrine and neglect the careful elaboration of the questions of the defensive on an operational scale."

The wagering on a maneuvering war in no way contradicted the possibility of waging it both in the form of an offensive and a defensive. Here the defensive can assume not only a positional nature but also a maneuvering one. S.S. Kamenev on this question wrote: "Maneuvering warfare requires from the troops the ability to maneuver not only with the successful course of an operation but also with setbacks." The profundity of this idea was beyond the reach of a majority of his contemporaries and for this we had to pay in 1941.

The conscious underestimation of the objective trends in military affairs, the violent instilling of strategic views and the elimination of broad strata of military theorists and practical workers from the elaboration of a theory of strategy—all of this naturally became established in the growing system at the end of the 1930's of command-administrative leadership over military science and could not but help cause the most negative consequences in the first encounter with combat reality. "The orientation of military theoretical thought and on which our command was educated over the years, out of inertia continued to influence the military mind, although it had long been in contradiction with the real facts of strategic reality..." concluded G. Isserson. "For this reason, the situation in which the Great Patriotic War commenced in June 1941 was unexpected for the entire subjective strategic and military theoretical orientation of our superior command and this gave rise to definite confusion and an inability to understand events, to subordinate them to one's will and seize initiative."

In summing up what has been stated, let us emphasize that the 1920's until the mid-1930's were a flourishing in the elaboration of the Soviet theory of military strategy. The objective needs of elaborating a military theory on a new methodological Marxist-Leninist basis, the necessity of analyzing the very rich combat experience of World War I

and the Civil War and the demands of ensuring the defense capability of the world's first worker and peasant state—all of this was an impetus for the awakening of military thought. The catalyst of creative activity was also the atmosphere of debate and a critical approach to any, even the most authoritative opinions. The accomplishments of the theory of strategy of those times were a vivid reflection of the progressive nature of Soviet military science and its very rich potential.

All the finest that was elaborated by Soviet military thought in those years was employed with honor by Soviet military science as the starting point in terms of those new conditions which arose during the difficult years of the Great Patriotic War. Undoubtedly a large portion of the Soviet military leaders who headed the Armed Forces during the years of fiery testing was raised in the finest traditions of the military theoretical school of the 1920's and the mid-1930's. As the very rich experience of the operations and engagements indicates, during the war years there was a succession of advanced strategic views of that period.

At present, in analyzing the historic distance covered by our society, it becomes clear that much that had been forgotten or had been suppressed requires an objective evaluation. This applies completely to the questions of the development of the Soviet theory of strategy in the 1920's and until the mid-1930's. And not only this!

Footnotes

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1965.
2. Zinovyev, "Voyna i krizis sotsializma" [War and the Crisis of Socialism], Petrograd, 1920, p 150.
3. VOYENNAYA MYSL I REVOLYUTSIYA, No 2, 1923, pp 78-89.
4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1965, p 50.
5. Ibid., p 51.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989.

Efforts to Strengthen Social, Military Discipline on Eve of WWII Considered

00010008d VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 51-59

[Article, published under the heading "Military Discipline: Lessons of History," by Col O.F. Suvenirov, Doctor of Historical Sciences: "If There Had Not Been That Bacchanalia"]

[Text] In a series of articles offered here to the readers' attention, an attempt has been made to explore and analyze the diverse work of the Communist Party and the

Soviet state, the military councils, the commanders, political bodies and party organizations in strengthening military discipline on the eve and during the first period of the Great Patriotic War.

The Times Required Emergency Measures

The Soviet leadership realized how real was the danger of a new armed clash with imperialism right after the end of the Civil War. By the mid-1930's, the threat of aggression had begun to grow, turning into one of the gloomier elements of reality. The centers of the new world war which broke out at the beginning of the 1930's in the Far East and in Central Europe were spreading evil flames.

For the Nazi-militaristic bloc which was preparing to win world domination, the years 1935 and 1936 were crucial. Germany, under the power of the Nazis, was rapidly assuming the traits of a militaristic state. In March 1935, the Nazi government openly repudiated the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty and passed a law on the establishing of the Wehrmacht and the introduction of universal military service. Instead of decisively opposing the violations, the English government in June 1935 concluded an Anglo-German Naval Agreement under which Nazi Germany was actually permitted to increase its navy by 5.5-fold. This was an act of direct legalization for the arming of the Nazi Reich and which caused rejoicing in the camp of its leaders. "Hitler and I," Ribbentrop recalled later on, "were very satisfied with this treaty. Hitler was happy as never before."¹

The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International (July-August 1935) provided a correct, Marxist-Leninist assessment of these events and the documents of the Congress contained the clear conclusion that the aggressive forces of international imperialism, primarily the fascist states, had begun immediate preparations for a new world war.

Two months later, all mankind was convinced of the scientific soundness of this political prognosis. Fascism began outright military aggression against the peoples of various countries. In October 1935, the troops of Fascist Italy invaded Ethiopia and in March of the following year, Nazi Germany abrogated the Locarno Treaties and reintroduced its troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. A session of the Presidium of the Comintern Executive Committee which lasted from 23 March through 1 April 1936, in its decree stated: "Never since 1914 has the threat of world war been so great as now."² From July 1936, outright German-Italian intervention against Republic Spain spread ever-wider.

Alarming events followed one after another. In July 1937, imperialist Japan made a rapacious attack on China and a year later provoked a military conflict with the USSR in the area of Lake Khasan. In September 1938, the English and French governments disgracefully

surrendered to the evermore brazen fascism and surrendered for Nazi plundering the Sudetenland initially and in March 1939, Czechoslovakia. In the summer of 1939, Japanese troops invaded Mongolia and on 1 September of the same year by an attack on Poland, Naziism unleashed World War II.

Under these unusually complex conditions, the young Soviet state did everything within its power to prevent a new world war and when it had become a fact, to erect a dependable, as far as possible, shield which would restrict the further spread of Nazi aggression to the east.

Simultaneously, among the personnel of the Red Army and Navy, extensive work was being done to explain the growing danger of imperialist aggression against the Soviet Union and the necessity of the greatest possible strengthening of the combat might of the Armed Forces, the maintaining, strengthening and improving of military discipline as an absolutely essential condition for carrying out the new tasks. Even in November 1935, in an order from the people's commissar of defense [NKO], in describing the international military-political situation, the attention of the personnel of the RKKA [Worker-Peasant Red Army] was drawn to the fact that "evermore clearly one can see the terrible threat of a new world war...the most frenzied imperialist aggressors continue intense preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union."³

The course of historical events shows that the Soviet Union was directly threatened by the major imperialist countries and their possible coalitions. There would be a clash with the giants of world imperialism. The course openly proclaimed by them of eradicating communism, of seizing world domination, as well as the brazen, predatory actions of the Nazis, predetermined the conclusion of the 18th VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Congress in March 1939 that precisely Germany was the most probably enemy in the anti-Soviet war being planned by the imperialists. The treaties concluded with this state on nonaggression (23 August 1939) and on friendship and the frontier between the USSR and Germany (28 September 1939) strongly disrupted but could not completely eliminate this assessment or remove the anti-Sovietism which was organically inherent to Naziism.

The significant military successes of the Nazis in the war against Poland and then again against France and England evermore strengthened the threat of Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union and this was confirmed not only by the general political course of Nazi Germany, but also by many military-strategic measures carried out by it, and primarily the large concentration of German troops along the Soviet western frontier. From October 1939, upon orders of the German military command, continuous air reconnaissance was carried out on the defensive fortifications, the airfields, troop locations in the USSR border zone. Before the start of the war, German aircraft appeared over 500 times over

the territory of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.⁴ At the same time, it was essential not to underestimate the danger of anti-Soviet aggression in the Far East on the part of imperialist Japan. Hence, there was the major problem of ensuring a level of Soviet military discipline, order and organization which would make it possible not only to withstand but also sustain a victory in a fight that was becoming evermore inevitable against the armies of the developed imperialist states which were strong, armed with then modern equipment and well drilled.

One of the crucial prerequisites for strengthening discipline in the army was a sharp rise in the level of organization and discipline in the nation as a whole. On 28 December 1938, the USSR SNK [Council of People's Commissars], the VKP(b) Central Committee and the AUCCTU adopted a decree aimed at strengthening labor discipline and combating disorganizers in production, loafers, job-hoppers and absentees. In 1939, obligatory rates for the working of labor days were set on the kolkhozes. In April 1940, the 10th AUCCTU Plenum prohibited the trade union organizations from convening various meetings and sessions during working hours and obliged that all the assignments of the trade union and other social organizations be carried out by the employees solely in nonworking time. The Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 June 1940 introduced an 8-hour working day (instead of a 7-hour one) and a 7-day work week with 6 workdays and a day off (instead of the 6-day work week with a day off on the 6th, 12th, 18th, 24th and 30th of each month). The same Ukase prohibited the independent (without the permission of the administration) departure of employees from enterprises and institutions. Criminal responsibility was established for absenteeism (being over 20 minutes late to work was considered as absenteeism) and the independent leaving of work.

What enormous significance was given to these measures can be seen from the fact that a little more than a month later, at the end of July 1940, the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum specially discussed the question "On Supervision Over the Carrying Out of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 June 1940 'On Shifting to an 8-Hour Workday and to a 7-Day Work Week and Prohibiting the Independent Departure of Employees From Enterprises and Institutions'." The VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum felt that the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 26 June 1940 "was being carried out unsatisfactorily." The Central Committee Plenum ruled that the communists and Komsomol members who had independently left enterprises and institutions or had been absent without leave should not only be subject to punishment in the courts but also expelled from the ranks of the VKP(b) or the Komsomol, as persistent violators of state and party discipline.

The VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum recognized as incorrect that many enterprise directors, instead of fully

utilizing the authority given them and "not be afraid of instilling discipline even by the use of repression" (emphasis mine.—Author), played the liberal with absentees and production disorganizers, refused to remand them to the court and actually did not instill discipline but merely chattered about it. The Central Committee Plenum recognized the need to incorporate in the RSFSR Penal Code amendments which would harden the punishments so that employees guilty of minor theft, regardless of the amount, as well as those guilty of hooliganism at the enterprise, institution or in a public place, even if it was committed for the first time, would be punished under a sentence of the people's court by imprisonment of a period of at least 1 year. The VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum placed personal responsibility on the people's commissars for carrying out the new Ukase, the USSR Procurator M. Pankrayevich was removed from the post as unable to handle his duties and not supervising the fulfillment of the Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

These decisions of the July (1940) VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum are further proof that the administrative-command system of party-state leadership of the nation which had arisen at the end of the 1920's from the second half of the 1930's had begun to be turned into a command-repressive system.

Thus, from the summer of 1940, a very severe discipline unprecedented under peacetime conditions began to be installed in the country. Naturally, this required a further rise in discipline in the Army and Navy. The solemn taking and unswerving observance of the military oath was the inexorable basis for maintaining Soviet military discipline on a high level. Prior to 1939, there was a solemn promise approved by the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee] in 1923. Annually on May Day the text of the promise was read by responsible representatives of Soviet power and the military command while the soldiers as a chorus repeated it. After the conclusion of this ritual, the military oath was considered taken. The nature of its taking and the circumstance that far from all the men were in formation during this solemn moment (on detail, sickness and so forth) in no way helped in the proper educating of a feeling of personal responsibility for carrying out military duty in each serviceman.

On 3 January 1939, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet approved a new text for the military oath for the RKKA and Navy as well as a new regulation concerning the procedure for taking it. From now on, the vow to the motherland to be an honest, brave and disciplined soldier, to unswervingly carry out all the requirements of the military regulations and the orders of the commanders and superiors was to be taken by the servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces individually, in personally reading the text of the military oath in front of the formation of combat comrades and reinforcing this with their own handwritten signature. The day of the taking of the oath by the personnel was declared a solemn holiday

for the unit. In the troops and on the ships they organized and carried out all-encompassing party-political work in explaining the content and significance of the new text for the military oath and in accord with the decision of the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, all the personnel of the Red Army, Navy and Border Guard Troops was to take the military oath on the day of the 21st anniversary of the Red Army, 23 February 1939.

The local military operations of the Red Army in the prewar years were a serious testing of the strength and qualitative level of Soviet military discipline. In the course of fighting at Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin-Gol River, in the process of the campaign into the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia and particularly during the Soviet-Finnish War, the Red Army personnel showed high examples of revolutionary discipline. At the same time, an insufficient preparedness of certain elements of the Soviet military mechanism to conduct modern combat and an urgent need for improving and further strengthening military discipline became apparent.

Evermore obvious was the inadmissibility of keeping any further the territorial system for organizing the army and the discrepancy of this system to the needs and new tasks involved in the military defense of the USSR. "In terms of training level," commented MSU G.K. Zhukov, "our territorial units were in no comparison with the regular ones. I happened to be involved at Khalkhin-Gol with one such territorial division, the 82d. It fled from several artillery rounds by the Japanese. We had to stop it by all available means, commanders had to be sent out from the command post at Khamar-Daby and positioned in an extended line across the steppe. We scarcely stopped them."⁵ The substantial flaws in the system of maintaining high military discipline showed up under the difficult conditions of conducting armed combat on the Karelian Isthmus in the winter of 1939-1940.

The New Law Governing Universal Military Service adopted on 1 September 1939 by the Extraordinary Fourth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, First Sitting, once and for all reinforced the transition of the Soviet Armed Forces to a unified cadre system. The results of the war with Finland were discussed in detail at the March (1940) VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum. Major failings in combat training, the strengthening of discipline and strict military order became apparent in 1940 in the course of the work of a party-governmental commission which inspected the condition of the Armed Forces. It was decided to strengthen the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense. In May 1940, Hero of the Soviet Union, MSU S.K. Timoshenko, who had gained experience in troop leadership in the course of the Soviet-Finnish War became the people's commissar of defense in the place of K.Ye. Voroshilov who was released from this position.

Upon instructions of the Party Central Committee and under its supervision, intense work got underway in the USSR Armed Forces to decisively restructure the entire

process of military and political training and for maintaining and strengthening discipline. The new people's commissar defined its goals as follows:

- To instill Bolshevik order in combat training, the life and routine of the Red Army;
- Training and education of the troops are to be brought close to combat conditions;
- There is to be a struggle for a decisive strengthening of Soviet military discipline.⁶

With full justification one can call the year 1940 the year of the decisive restructuring of the entire life of the RKKA. The entire system of military and political training underwent a fundamental change. New demands on it were set by the NKO in Order No. 120 of 16 May 1940 and clarified in Order No. 30 of 29 January 1941 as well as in the Directive of the Main Political Propaganda Directorate of the Red Army (GUPP KA) "On the Restructuring of Party-Political Work" (August 1940). The principle of bringing daily training as close as possible to the conditions of a combat situation began to be carried out unswervingly. The demand of "teach the troops only what is necessary in a war and only as is done in a war" became a combat slogan of those times.

There was a decisive, uncompromising struggle against any sort of conditionality in combat training and its intensity rose sharply. All levels of commanders and staffs had to instruct the troops under difficult combat conditions involving a protracted physical effort. It was recommended that 30 percent of the training time for tactical training be employed for conducting nighttime exercises. The training day was filled up as much as possible. In the cavalry and artillery this was 9 hours, in the mechanized units 10 hours and in the infantry 12 hours. Moreover, on days off 2 hours were assigned for study without fail.

The restructuring of combat and political training placed new, increased demands on military discipline of all the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. A "big war" was approaching and the size of the Red Army and Navy was increasing rapidly. While in 1933, the Red Army and Navy numbered only 885,000 men, on 1 January 1937, the figure was 1,433,000 men and on 1 January 1941, already 4,207,000 men. In June 1941, their number reached 5,373,000 men, with 4,553,000 men serving in the Ground Troops and Air Defense Troops, 476,000 in the Air Forces and 344,000 in the Navy.⁷

The numerous and diverse measures by the party, the government and the military department to strengthen discipline in the prewar years can be arbitrarily divided in three main areas. The first brings together those which were aimed at increasing the demands on the personal discipline of each communist and Komsomol member and the search for new ways to strengthen the role of the

political bodies and party organizations in strengthening military discipline. The second could include measures aimed at strengthening the authority of the commanders and superiors, raising the demands placed on their personal discipline and strengthening their organizing role in ensuring proper order in the troops. Finally, the measures to ensure high discipline in the junior supervisory personnel and the several million Red Armymen and Red Navymen must be put in the third area.

The Vanguard Role of the Army and Navy Communists

The struggle for the greatest possible rise in the personal discipline of all Army and Navy communists and their role in ensuring a high level of discipline by all the personnel was carried out during the prewar years continuously and by the most diverse methods. Over a number of years, of fundamental significance in this area were the decisions of the Third All-Army Conference of Party Organization Secretaries (1931) and adopted after a detailed discussion of the question concerning the role and place of the Red Army and Navy party organizations in strengthening the discipline of all the personnel and the special significance of the personal example set by each Army and Navy communist.

The carrying out of these decisions even at the start of the 1930's provided definite positive results. While in the fourth quarter of 1931 in all the RKKA only 67 subunits did not have any disciplinary infractions, in the second quarter of 1932, there were already 553 of such subunits. Moreover, in the second quarter of 1932 there were no disciplinary infractions by party members in 751 cells and for Komsomol members in 735 cells.⁸

The successes could have been even more significant if there had not been the mass expulsions of military communists from the party in 1937 in line with the mass unjustified repressions against the military personnel. Many Army and Navy party organizations, in essence, at that time replaced concrete, daily painstaking work to ensure the vanguard role of the communists and strengthen military discipline by assiduous activity to identify and disclose "enemies of the people" and "their supporters." And how could it have been otherwise, when even the workers of the RKKA Political Directorate, having assembled at a meeting over the question of handing down a death sentence for the "Tukhachevskiy band" and having employed indecent words against their former chief Gamarnik, in the approved resolution thus defined one of the main tasks of the Soviet military: "As long as the USSR is in capitalist encirclement...each Red Armyman, commander and political worker should be a forward scout for our socialist motherland. We ourselves must become active volunteers for the NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] in disclosing enemies of the people."⁹

The number of Army and Navy communists brought up in 1937 for a party reprimand and expelled from it rose month by month, increasing in almost a geometric progression (see the table).¹⁰

Table

1937 Quarter	Persons Brought Up for Party Reprimand	Of Those, Expelled From Party
1st	2,659	702
2d	3,444	1,131
3d	7,838	3,961
4th	9,658	4,547

Even one of the most zealous "fighters against the enemies of the people," L.Z. Mekhlis who on 6 January 1938 was appointed the chief of the RKKA Political Directorate, commented: "It is not true that there is such an enormous number of enemies in the party,"¹¹ and in the report at the All-Army Conference of Political Workers (April 1938) was forced to admit that "if the VKP(b) Central Committee did not halt this criminal bacchanalia, we would destroy the entire RKKA party organization."¹² In order to have a better understanding of what a fatal year 1937 was for the Red Army party organization, let us recall to the reader that in comparison with 1936, when in the RKKA 712 persons were expelled from the party from among those who had received their party documents,¹³ in 1937 almost 16-fold more were expelled. The party group in the Armed Forces in 1937 declined by 2.5-fold in comparison with 1932, and the number of Red Armymen and junior commanders was less than 1 percent in the party organization (1,330 persons in all the Armed Forces).¹⁴

A major role in eliminating such an abnormal situation was played by the Decree of the January (1938) VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum "On Errors of Party Organizations in Expelling Communists From the Party, on the formal-bureaucratic attitude toward the appeals of those expelled from the RKP(b) and on measures to eliminate these shortcomings." In this decree V.K.P.(b) Central Committee Plenum obliged the obkoms, the kraykoms, the central committees of the national communist parties and all the party organizations "to end decisively the mass, indiscriminate expulsions from the party and establish in fact an individual, differentiated approach in resolving the question of expelling party members from the party or restoring those expelled to the rights as party members."¹⁵

The errors which were pointed out by the VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum applied fully to the Red Army party organizations. At the beginning of 1938, at the party commission of the RKKA (Political Directorate) there still remained over 1,300 still unexamined requests from communists complaining about injustice done to them.¹⁶

Due to the fact that certain party organizations without justification expelled from the party commanders and commissars of regiments, brigades and divisions, not considering that the question of their party loyalty should be determined with the knowledge and approval of the RKKA Political Directorate which worked as a

section of the VKP(b) Central Committee, on 25 February 1938, the RKKA Political Directorate issued to all party bodies a directive approved by the VKP(b) Central Committee which stated: "The RKKA Political Directorate on the basis of the instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee explains that such practices are incorrect and that in all instances when the RKKA primary party organizations possess materials which doubt the party loyalty of the commanders and commissars of the regiments, brigades, divisions and higher, it is essential to forward a copy of all the materials to the RKKA Political Directorate and only with its approval can the question of the party loyalty of one or another worker be examined."¹⁷

Regardless of this measure, in 1938, 490 persons of just the level of unit and formation commanders were expelled from the party.¹⁸

In December of the same year, it was additionally established that all cases concerning party loyalty and party infractions of commanders and commissars of the individual units and formations should not be examined by the primary party organizations but only by the superior party levels. The question of holding the given group of command personnel responsible to the party was to be settled independently by the party commission in the presence of the primary party organization secretary.¹⁹

In February 1939, this procedure was also extended to the Navy. Its establishing at that time assumed very important significance as to a certain degree the measures being carried out protected the commanders and the commissars of the units and formations against unjust accusations, they made it possible to avoid unjustified expulsions from the party and helped check that irresponsibility which often occurred.

Due to the effective work of the political bodies, the number of Army and Navy communists by the beginning of the war in comparison with the end of 1937, had increased by almost 4-fold. On 1 July 1941, the RKKA and the Navy had active 14,751 primary organizations bringing together 563,500 communists.²⁰

In the process of the local combat operations to defend the socialist fatherland, the Army and Navy communists demonstrated, as a rule, examples of military discipline. But with the growing danger of a major war, the demands on the discipline of the communists further rose. In an editorial of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA entitled "Party Organizations in the Fight to Strengthen Military Discipline," it was written that "for the army party organizations at present there is no more important concern than the fight for an unceasing strengthening of discipline,"²¹ that all the forces, all the energy of the party and nonparty Bolsheviks of the Red Army should be mobilized precisely at carrying out this task and that precisely this was now "the primary duty of all the party-political workers, all the communists, and their

party duty consists precisely of this."²² The decisive role of the personal example of each communist was emphasized with particular force in the area of the unfailing observance of all requirements of Soviet military discipline. "It cannot be tolerated," the newspaper wrote, "that even one communist to any degree whatsoever violated Soviet military discipline. Each such instance should be viewed as an extraordinary phenomenon. Belonging to the Bolshevik party in and of itself presupposes exemplary discipline. Any deviation whatsoever from iron military order is unworthy of a Bolshevik, it sullies the high title of party member or Komsomol member. Persons guilty of this merit severe punishment."²³

A most important area in the work of the army communists in strengthening military discipline was the daily explanation of the need to maintain it on a high level, active personal involvement in agitation and propaganda work both among the communists as well as among the nonparty soldiers. These activities to a large degree helped to strengthen the conscientious attitude of the soldiers and commanders to the questions of maintaining and strengthening discipline.

However, it is essential to point out that party-political work during the prewar years was influenced by one extremely unfavorable factor. Even from the end of the 1920's the media of the press as well as verbal agitation and propaganda began to create a cult of Stalin's personality and he was glorified as the greatest of the great, the wisest of the wise, the most inspired of the inspired. For a modern reader who was not exposed to the effect of such a propagandistic press, it is even hard to imagine the unlimited nature of extolling Stalin's personality: hundreds of monuments even while alive, sculptured busts and portraits in all museums and at exhibits, scores of towns and cities and many hundreds of streets and boulevards named after him and so forth.

For strengthening political agitation and propaganda in the Armed Forces, in July 1940, the RKKA Political Directorate was renamed the Main Political Propaganda Directorate of the Red Army [GUPP KA]. On 29 July 1940, the NKO signed an order on renaming the political directorates of the districts and armies and the political sections of the formations as the appropriate directorates and sections of political propaganda. A special directive of the GUPP KA demanded: "To explain to all political workers, to the supervisory personnel, the party and Komsomol organizations that this measure is no mere technical act but is aimed at turning the political bodies and party-Komsomol organizations in the Red Army toward questions of political propaganda and the greatest possible strengthening of educational work among the servicemen."²⁴ In assessing this reorganization it is essential to consider that it ran contrary to the Party Bylaws adopted by the 18th VKP(b) Congress in March 1939 where it was directly stated that leadership over the party work in the RKKA was to be carried out by the RKKA Political Directorate which operated with the

rights of the military section of the VKP(b) Central Committee and in the Navy by the Political Directorate which worked with the rights of the naval section of the VKP(b) Central Committee.²⁵ The reorganization substantially restricted the rights of the political bodies as the leading party bodies. Moreover, having given rights to the political bodies and having defined their functions, in essence, exclusively in the sphere of propaganda and agitation, it shifted party organizational work into the background. The tragic experience of the very first weeks of the war forced the restoring of the previous structure of the political bodies.

On 28 August 1940, the GUPP KA issued a special Directive No. 20 "On the Restructuring of Party-Political Work in the Aim of Subordinating It to the Tasks of Increasing Army Combat Readiness and Strengthening Military Discipline." The Directive set out one of the main requirements in the restructuring, that is, to make the company the center of party-political work and agitation and propaganda. Particular attention was paid to increasing the educational role of the party meetings. The directive obliged the chiefs of the political propaganda sections and their deputies to be present at party meetings in the units while the deputy regimental commanders for political affairs should attend the company party meetings and take an active part in their work.²⁶

The report-election meetings of the primary party organizations and the divisional and district party conferences held in November-December 1940 were an important measure aimed at strengthening and improving the forms and methods of work for the political bodies and party organizations in ensuring high discipline of all the personnel.

Life and combat training of the troops placed new demands on each serviceman. There was a struggle for firm order, high organization and discipline.

Footnotes

1. "Iz istorii vneshney politiki germanskogo imperializma" [From the History of the Foreign Policy of German Imperialism], Moscow, 1959, p 179.
2. Quoted in: KOMMUNIST, No 2, 1969, p 3.
3. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 7 November 1935.
4. "Krasnoznamennyy Kiyevskiy: Ocherk istorii Krasnoznamennogo Kiyevskogo voyennogo okruga (1919-1979)" [Red Banner Kiev: Essay on the History of the Red Banner Kiev Military District (1919-1979)], Kiev, 2d Edition, 1979, p 136.
5. Quoted in: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1987, p 53.
6. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 12 December 1940.

7. See: "50 let Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [50 Years of the Soviet Armed Forces], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, pp 198, 234; "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 4, 1975, p 18.

8. Central State Archives of the Soviet Army (below TsGASA), folio 9, inv. 36, file 595, sheet 196 verso.

9. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 14 June 1937.

10. TsGASA, folio 29, file 361, sheet 91.

11. PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V RKKA, No 1-2, 1938, p 15.

12. TsGASA, folio 29, file 361, sheet 91.

13. Ibid., folio 9, inv. 38, file 36, sheet 147.

14. See: Yu.P. Petrov, "Partiynoye stroitelstvo v Sovetskoy Armii i na Flote (1918-1961 gg.)" [Party Construction in the Soviet Army and Navy (1918-1961)], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1964, p 304.

15. "KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], Moscow, Politizdat, 9th Revised and Supplemented Edition, Vol 7, 1985, p 16.

16. PARTIYNO-POLITICHESKAYA RABOTA V RKKA, No 1-2, 1938, p 15.

17. Ibid., No 6, p 27.

18. TsGASA, folio 9, inv. 36, file 4297, sheet 16.

19. Ibid., inv. 29, file 414, sheet 120 verso.

20. See: "Istoriya KPSS" [History of the CPSU], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 5, Book 1, 1970, pp 373, 377.

21. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 11 August 1940.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota v Krasnoy Armii: Dokumenty" [Party-Political Work in the Red Army: Documents], July 1929-May 1941, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1985, p 428.

25. See: "XVIII syezd Vsesoyuznoy Kommunisticheskoy partii (b). 10-21 marta 1939 g." [18th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik). 10-21 March 1939: Verbatim Minutes], Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1939, p 686.

26. See: "Partiyno-politicheskaya rabota...." p 429.

(To Be Continued)

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal", 1989.

Book on WWII Arms Production, Procurement Reviewed

00010008e VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 60-64

[Review, published under the heading "In the Search for Truth," by Maj Gen V.V. Kolehchitskiy of the book "Oruzhiye Pobedy" [Weapon of Victory], Moscow, Mashinostroyeniye, 2d Revised and Supplemented Edition, 1987, 512 pages with illustrations]

[Text] The Izdatelstvo Mashinostroyeniye has published a bulky work¹ prepared by an author collective made up of workers from a number of the defense sectors of our industry.

The book "Oruzhiye Pobedy" [Weapon of Victory] describes how many types of weapons and military equipment for the Soviet Armed Forces were developed and produced before the Great Patriotic War and during it. The experience of the last war convincingly showed that in this area major miscalculations had been made and these had a lethal influence on the course of the armed struggle during the first period of the war, the most difficult one for the motherland. At present, when a reevaluation is underway for many historical events, the problem of the military-technical outfitting of the Army during the years of the last war has assumed exceptional significance.

The publication examines a significant number of types of weapons and equipment in service in the Army during the last war. This is its major cognitive value. However, it must be pointed out immediately that in a work devoted to the Soviet weapons of victory, one might wish to see a more complete picture of the comprehensive system for arming the Soviet Army and Navy which ensured victory during the Great Patriotic War. Unfortunately, the book does not contain descriptions of the weapons systems and military equipment of the Air Forces, Navy, Air Defense Troops, the engineer troops, chemical troops, signal troops and so forth. This is all the more important as our historical literature lacks profound systematic research on the designated problem. Only the future will show whether or not a place for this has been found in the ten-volume edition "Velikaya Otechestvennaya vojna Sovetskogo" [Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People].

The experience of history teaches that one of the most important conditions for victory is the presence in the required amount of weapons that are better than those of the enemy. The authors point out that "the Soviet Union during the time of the war produced almost 2-fold more weapons and military equipment than Nazi Germany and here with much better combat qualities" (p 5). They

emphasize that the USSR, the Soviet people and their Army achieved the Great Victory due to their weapons developed by Soviet scientists, designers, engineers and manufactured by Soviet workers who, in showing creative initiative, carried out, regardless of the enormous hardships, true labor feats. From numerous examples this is persuasively brought out in the book and this is a major merit for it.

The book names around 2,500 names of the developers of our weapons. In it a definite place has been assigned to the leaders of the CPSU, the Soviet state, the USSR State Defense Committee, including to I.V. Stalin, in the aim of showing their activities related to the development and production of weapons as well as supplying the Armed Forces with armament and military equipment in the course of the last war. The publication is richly illustrated with diagrams and photographs (over 600 altogether). However, the quality of many of the photographs is poor. The book is also provided with the corresponding scholarly apparatus. The list of literature employed, for example, numbers over 200 entries.

Thus, the work "Oruzhiye Pobedy" as a whole contains much factual material on many types of weapons and military equipment in the Soviet Armed Forces from the period of the past war as well as about their developers and the manufacturing plants.

One cannot help but agree with the authors that the experience of the defense sectors of industry in 1941-1945 to a certain degree is useful now. Also important is the experience gained at that time by other industrial sectors and plants involved in the production of defense products.

All 12 chapters of the work have been written approximately according to the same scheme: a general description of the weapons and military equipment of the given type in the prerevolutionary army, during the years of the Civil War; the state and development of weapons systems in the Soviet Army in the prewar years and during the Great Patriotic War. Here basic attention has been given to organizing the supply of the army with products from the defense plants in the course of the war, and they show the enormous difficulties in work arising because of the evacuation of 2,593 plants to the eastern regions of the nation as well as the labor heroism of the workers, engineers, designers and scientists. Each chapter is a unique report on the activities of the corresponding defense sector (subsector) and its successes during the years of the last war.

However, in our view, the book does not provide proper analysis of the level of the technical equipping of the Armed Forces or of the quality of our weapons and military equipment both during the prewar period as well as in the course of the war, and particularly in its first period. We feel that not enough light has been shed on the errors and major miscalculations in this area and

committed both on the part of the people's commissariats of the defense sectors of industry and the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense as well as by the representatives of the superior state leadership and specifically I.V. Stalin.

In the chapter devoted to the artillery, for example, it is asserted that the "organizational and technical measures carried out in the prewar years were prompt and provided exclusively positive results: by the start of the Great Patriotic War, the Red Army had over 67,300 first-rate weapons" (pp 34, 36). (Here and below the emphasis is mine.—Author.) But this assertion contradicts what was said in the introduction to the book, namely: the program for rearming the artillery had not been fully carried out before the war; a majority of the guns, particularly antiaircraft ones, and mortars was introduced just before the war; in the artillery weapons large-caliber guns prevailed to the detriment of antitank cannons and the supply of armor-piercing shells was low; the antiaircraft artillery was the weakest link. "All these oversights and failures had to be corrected in the course of the war..." (p 19). Around 40 percent of the artillery systems in use were designed and developed by industry during the war (p 21). The tactical and technical specifications for artillery weapons were sharply improved: the calibers of the tank and antitank weapons increased by 1.6-2.2-fold, the muzzle velocity of the shell by more than 1.5-fold, and armor-piercing capability by at least 5-fold (p 22). The range and rate of fire of the guns and the power of the shells were significantly increased, the proportional amount of antitank and rocket artillery rose and the maneuverability of the artillery was increased.

Consequently, artillery weapons in use by the start of the war largely did not meet the requirements of the war and beginning in 1941 there was an ongoing improvement of them.

The assertion by the authors that the Soviet Army by the beginning of the war possessed "first-rate" artillery does not correspond to the facts. The major mistakes in the prewar system of prewar weapons were sharply felt in the initial period of the war. These include: the extreme weakness of antiaircraft artillery with the complete enemy air supremacy, the absence of effective antitank artillery essential for combating the masses of German tanks, the low maneuverability of the regimental and divisional artillery (45-mm and 76-mm cannons) designed for close support of the infantry. All of this was one of the reasons for the major defeats of our troops in that period.

"It is generally recognized," the authors write, "that Soviet artillery weapons were more advanced than the artillery weapons of the Nazi Army" (p 75). This is correct and this was convincingly confirmed by the war, that is, its second half and the final results. But facts unambiguously show that in the first period of the war, the situation was somewhat different. This is why, in the interests of historical truth, it would be better to provide

an objective analysis of the real state and development of artillery in the prewar years and in the course of the war (by its periods).

The second chapter is devoted to naval ordnance. Here they basically review the questions of creating and producing ship ordnance for the Navy and the coastal defense artillery. This correctly points out that "according to the naval armament program before the start of the Great Patriotic War they had not succeeded in doing what they planned..." (p 106). The introduction of artillery mounts and the improving of the shore artillery also continued in the war.

In a special chapter of the book a great deal of attention is devoted to the history of creating and developing the mortar weapon system of the Soviet Army in the prewar years and during the war. This system by the beginning of the war included the company 50-mm mortars, the battalion 82-mm ones, the regimental mountain mule-back 107-mm and regimental 120-mm mortars. In the course of the war, substantial changes occurred in this: in 1943 the divisional 160-mm high-powered mortar was developed and commissioned and the 50-mm mortar was taken out of service due to poor effectiveness. The remaining models of mortars were modernized.

Consequently, the prewar mortar weapons system did not fully conform to the conditions of combat employment. As for the quantitative supply of the Armed Forces with mortars, at the outset of the war these were clearly in short supply and the German mortars caused tangible damage to our infantry. By the start of the war, the army had just 13,000 of the 82-mm mortars and 3,000 of the 120-mm mortars. But already by the end of 1943, the situation had sharply improved as industry produced around 120,000 mortars.

In describing the development of rocket artillery, the authors point out that before the war it was possible to develop a number of successful models of rocket artillery. But only on 21 June 1941 did the leadership take a decision to start up series production of the M-13 shells and the BM-13 launchers and begin constituting rocket artillery units (p 164). In August-September 1941, 324 BM-13 and BM-8 combat vehicles were dispatched to the front and they began constituting individual batteries, battalions and regiments of rocket artillery, the guards mortar units (GMCh). Subsequently, the GMCh were organized into brigades and divisions (p 167).

The initiating of the production of rocket artillery started with a significant and unjustified delay due to the underestimation of this effective weapon and this can be considered as yet another major shortcoming. Nevertheless, in the course of the war a series of new models of rocket artillery was developed and its mass production organized. It became a real, terrible fire force.

In the book a good deal of space is given over to the chapter on tanks and SAU [self-propelled artillery

mount]. This is natural. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War, our tanks troops, as is known, were in a stage of rearming. Industry had begun producing the new, for those times modern T-34 and KV tanks in 1940. By June 1941, the Army had a total of 1,861 such combat vehicles and this was 18.2 percent of the total number of tanks; the remainder were light and obsolete. The need for the new T-34 and KV tanks had been estimated at 16,600. The average supply ratio for the troops, including the mechanized corps, with all types of tanks was just 53 percent (p 209). In the first engagements of the war, our armored troops suffered heavy losses, and by December 1941, only 1,731 tanks remained in the army in the field. This number also included 1,214 light tanks (p 212).

The situation with the technical arming of the Soviet armored troops improved somewhat only in November 1942.

In the initial period of the war, self-propelled artillery was virtually absent in the Soviet Army. Only in October 1942 did the GKO [State Defense Committee] order the start of work on developing two types of SAU designed for the support and escorting of tanks and for close infantry support. The combat might of the armored troops rose significantly during the course of the war with the delivery of SAU to them. During the war years, the tank industry manufactured over 100,000 tanks and SAU which in terms of their fighting capabilities surpassed the German Army tanks and assault guns (p 238).

In a chapter devoted to small arms, it is correctly emphasized that they played an enormous role in combat operations. This is shown by the figures of losses in World War II in the personnel of the warring armies from small-arms fire; these losses were at times 50 percent of the total losses (p 242).²

"Advanced small arms and other types of weapons and military equipment produced in ever-increasing amounts became the material basis for the combat might of the Red Army which crushed the military machine of German Nazism," noted the authors (p 281). But this is again true in terms of the results of the war and its second half. In the first months of the fighting, the situation was different. This should have been emphasized in the reviewed work.

In the initial period of the war, the German divisions were manned and armed according to the wartime TOE and had from 14,000 to 16,000 men (an average of up to 10,000). They surpassed our divisions in fire power, strike force, maneuverability and in control and command equipment. A majority of the Soviet divisions numbered from 5,000 to 7,000 men and only one-quarter had up to 8,000 men.³ But our rifle divisions even of 8,000-man strength were, as MSU G.K. Zhukov has asserted, "in practical terms 2-fold weaker than the Germans." He reported these very important data to Stalin on the eve of the war (13 June 1941).⁴

Under conditions where the enemy possessed full air supremacy and was advancing with powerful tank groupings, our troops particularly lacked anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons. Their basic weapon against tanks was bottles with an inflammatory mixture [Molotov cocktail], grenades and antitank rifles and against aircraft just rifles.

The low level of technical outfitting of the Soviet rifle divisions was one of the main reasons for the defeats of the Soviet Army in the first period of the war, for the outcome of the military operations was determined chiefly on the tactical level of the rifle troops. Our armored troops and Air Forces were still in the stage of technical rearming and could not take an active part in combat actions.

The serious shortcomings in the army small-arms system established by the start of the war had to be eliminated in the course of it. As a result, almost one-half of the small arms was replaced.⁵

Only by the end of 1942 did the situation with the technical arming of the rifle divisions and the Ground Troops as a whole change for the better. In 1943, their equipment level already doubled in comparison with the previous year.

Individual chapters in the book are devoted to optical instruments and ammunition. They examine with sufficient detail the questions of developing and supplying the Armed Forces with the corresponding defense products from the optical instrument industry and the ammunition industry before the war and in the course of it. The ammunition industry in the course of the war had to make up for what had been overlooked in the prewar period and constantly modernize or develop new models of product. Thus, during the war over 50 types of aviation bombs were modernized and developed, over 40 types of various mines and fuzes and 85 types of optical instruments (pp 423, 426, 362).

The concluding chapter examines military motor vehicles. The reader will learn that by the beginning of the war, the Soviet Army had 272,600 motor vehicles and that of the 205,000 motor vehicles produced by Soviet plants during the war, the Army received 150,000 vehicles (p 480). But what were the army's need for motor vehicles, the degree of their supply to the troops, as well as the mechanization level in our army and the enemy's? The book does not provide any answer to these and other questions. At the same time, it is known that by the beginning of the war the Ground Troops in terms of motor vehicle equipment was only at 40 percent of the TOE strength⁶ and a rifle division of ours, even those in the border military districts, had several-fold less vehicles than in an enemy infantry division.⁷

A brief analysis of the state of the weapons system of the Soviet Army prior to the war and in the course of it indicates that from its very outset, even in 1941, the most urgent measures had to be taken in the technical reequipping of the Army with more efficient weapons

and military equipment, as many of our models were inferior to the German ones and did not meet the requirements of armed combat.

In the course of the war there was, in essence, an ongoing rearming of the Army with modern weapons and military equipment by modernizing the existing models and developing new ones. It must be emphasized that in 1943, the share of new military equipment was: 42.3 percent in small-arms weapons, 83 percent in artillery, over 80 percent in armored and 67 percent in aviation.⁸ In 1945, these indicators were even higher.

The quantitative and qualitative ratios of the main types of weapons in the Soviet and Nazi armies in the field changed in the favor of our army only by the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943. Thus, the entire initial and first periods of the war occurred under conditions of military-technical superiority for the enemy and this was the main reason for our catastrophic defeats and terrible losses.

This is why, in referring to the facts from the experience of the Great Patriotic War, one cannot agree with the assertion by the work's authors that on the eve of the war "the defense industry of the Soviet Union at an increasing pace was continuously supplying the Red Army with first-rate weapons" (p 209) and that "a scientifically sound system of Soviet weapons developed in the prewar years proved fully effective" (p 75) and that in the first period of the war the economy continuously supplied combat equipment to the army in the field (p 5).

Such assertions do not correspond to the historical truth and are examples of ostentatious reports characteristic of the administrative-command management system. One is chagrined and surprised that such works would appear in 1987!

Unfortunately, in VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL (No 6, 1987) in the article "Technical Rearming of the Soviet Army on the Eve of the War" one can also find the assertion which incorrectly, in our view, reflects the true state of affairs: "The weapons system developed in the prewar years for the Soviet Army was so advanced and well-designed that in the course of the war the existing production process did not have to be broken." But certainly it is known what a fundamental restructuring was carried out from the very outset of the war in industry and in the organization and methods of production. This is persuasively shown from the extensive factual material found in the book concerning the work of the industrial enterprises and the improving of the weapons system.

I.V. Stalin is mentioned virtually in each chapter of the reviewed work. Undoubtedly, both before the war and in the course of it he was largely concerned with the questions of developing and producing weapons and military equipment as well as the leadership of the defense sectors of industry and the USSR People's

Commissariat of Defense. His role in this area, undoubtedly, merits a positive evaluation. But Stalin was also responsible for major errors and shortcomings which were committed before the war in the technical equipping of the Armed Forces. The book does not have any analysis of his activities involving the solution to this important and complicated question and it would have been within the scope of the authors who were former major workers in the defense sectors of industry. The book does not even mention the repressions of 1937-1938 and 1941 which largely involved the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the industrial people's commissariats, the directors and specialists of the major enterprises, scientific research institutes and design bureaus, scientists and designers, particularly in the defense sectors of production. And this undoubtedly caused substantial harm to the question of the technical rearming of the Army and Navy on the eve of the war.

Editorial errors are also encountered. Thus, in a number of chapters without any need they repeat materials on Germany's attack and the evacuation of enterprises to the eastern regions of the nation. Here contradictions occur: on p 17 it is pointed out that in the second half of 1941, 2,593 industrial enterprises had been evacuated, including 1,593 large ones, while on p 128, these same figures are 1,523 and 1,360, while on p 258 one can read that "over 1,500 large enterprises alone" were evacuated to the east. It is hard to explain why all of a sudden in the chapter concerning mortars (p 128) the issue arises of the treacherous attack by Nazi Germany and Stalin's radio speech on 3 July 1941 setting out the program for the Soviet people's struggle against the enemy. Clearly this material should have been better placed in the introduction.

The endless dithyrambs addressed to the people's commissars and head designers grate on one's ears.... It cannot be considered correct that the book mentions the name of V.N. Novikov more than 20 times. He was the former deputy people's commissar of armaments and it should be remembered that the reviewed book was prepared under his overall editorship and that he is one of the authors and the chairman of the editorial board.

In conclusion we would like to express the desire that the problems of the equipping of the Army and Navy with weapons and military equipment on the eve and in the course of the last war be properly taken up in the ten-volume edition on the Great Patriotic War. An objective demonstration of the actual state and directions for improving weapons will make it possible to correctly understand the dynamics in the development of fighting methods and the organizational structures of the troops in the various stages of the armed combat. Profound additional research by military historians should be organized for this purpose.

Footnotes

1. That is, the book reviewed "Oruzhiye Pobedy."

2. The author of the review considers himself right to affirm this information in being guided by his own personal experience. He was in the army in the field for the entire war, basically in the infantry. Of the four wounds he received, three were bullet wounds.

3. "Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna sovetskogo naroda" [The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People], Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, p 587.

4. G.K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Recollections and Reflections], Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1969, p 241.

5. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny, 1939-1945" [History of World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Voenizdat, Vol 12, 1982, p 244.

6. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1987, p 22.

7. Ibid., No 8, 1988, p 33.

8. "Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy...", Vol 12, p 160.

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989.

Brief Biography of Vasiliy Stalin

00010008/VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 65-69

[Article by Maj A.N. Kolesnik, candidate of historical sciences: "The Rise and Fall of Vasiliy Stalin"]

[Text] The early years of Vasiliy Stalin were spent at the dacha in Zubanovo under the supervision of the pedagogue Aleksandr Ivanovich Maravyev who taught him the basics of Russian and German, and introduced him to reading and drawing. Vasiliy was frequently in contact with the families of Mikoyan, Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov whose dachas were near. The household was run by Polina Vasilyevna Timm. On days off and holidays, Budenny would appear with an accordion and then there would be singing which most often involved Voroshilov and sometimes the master of the dacha himself would join in. The arrivals of N.I. Bukharin were also particularly happy occasions. He brought toys and even little wild animals.

In 1929, Vasiliy went to study in the Moscow Special School. Even in the primary classes the teachers commented on his nervous, extremely impulsive nature. Clearly, he was influenced by family life among the Stalins. The father was busy with his own doings and the mother, Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva, during this time was studying at the Industrial Academy and simultaneously working in an editorial office. She was strict with her children. The parents, as a rule, spent their summer holidays on the Black Seacoast but the children remained for this time in Moscow.

The father had the habit of giving his children Georgian wine. This upset the mother but this was also ignored. The seemingly harmless habit taken up in childhood was subsequently to become a vice and lead the son to his death. At age 11, Vasiliy experienced certainly the most terrible shock, the tragic death of his mother.

Vasiliy personally knew all the members of the then government and he often met them at the dacha. He overheard their conversations and the speeches of his father. One can only wonder what changes went on in his mind with the soon following repressions of his mother's relatives, prominent party and state figures and military leaders. As a boy he had been bounced on the knees of many of them. Undoubtedly, these repressions had an impact on him and left a trace, imprinting all his subsequent behavior.

After the mother's death, the family moved into the Kremlin. Gradually the habits of the children began to change. Vasiliy was looked after by the security and the servants. Showing his obstinacy, he rejected a teacher who had been selected at one time by his mother. The chief of the father's personal guard Vlasik actually became his guardian and soon thereafter did his beck and call.

Upon orders by Stalin, Vasiliy was escorted everywhere by an NKVD [People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs] security. He even went to school under escort. He read poorly. He prepared negligently for his exercises and studied poorly. The teachers were rather afraid of their student and in lessons virtually never asked any questions. If such a thing did happen, then in response there might be any sort of impoliteness. If the entire class had not wanted to enter flying school, then he probably would have stopped going to class. At that time, the pilot's profession was the most heroic and the most attractive, like the profession of a cosmonaut today.

Vasiliy had a completely different attitude toward sports exercises. He liked running and skiing. In being of rather average physique and not working particularly hard in his training, he nevertheless in competitions showed enviable will and it was rare when he did not end up among the five strongest.

After completing 9th grade, all his fellow classmates actually did enter the Red Banner Kachina Military Air School imeni Myasnikov.

Coming down to us is a handwritten autobiography in which Vasiliy Stalin described in sufficient detail his life during the period from 1938 through 1945:

[Beginning of document] I was born in 1921, in Moscow, in the family of a professional revolutionary. From 1921 through 1938, I was supported by my parents and studied.

In 1938, after completing nine grades of secondary school, I entered the Red Banner Kachina Military Pilots School which I completed in 1940 and was appointed a pilot in the 16th Fighter Air Regiment of the 24th Fighter Air Division in which I served until September 1940. In September 1940, I entered the command faculty of the Air Force Academy where I studied until December 1940.

In January 1941, I was sent to the Lipetsk Aviation Courses for the Advanced Training of Squadron Commanders and these I completed in May 1941. In June 1941, I was appointed to the position of inspector pilot of the Red Army Air Forces Directorate.

I served in this position until September 1941, after which until January 1943, I served as chief of the Red Army Air Forces Inspectorate.

In January 1943, I was appointed commander of the 32d Guards Fighter Air Regiment where I served until December 1943.

In January 1944, I was appointed to the position of commander of the Bryansk, Red Banner and Order of Suvorov 3d Guards Fighter Air Division and from February 1945, I was appointed to the position of commander of the Nezhin Red Banner Order of Suvorov 286th Fighter Air Division.

During the period of my stay on the fronts of the Patriotic War I did not receive any wounds or concussions. I was not taken prisoner or surrounded. I have been a member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] since 1940. I am married and my wife is Galina Aleksandrovna Burdonskaya and I have two children, a son Aleksandr and a daughter Nadezhda. The family resides in Moscow.

18 June 1945, V. Stalin

[End of document]

Subsequently, he will sign all documents exclusively with just "Stalin." The party nickname of his father became the family name of the son from his birthday.

After the Germans captured Yakov Dzhughashvili, the elder son of Stalin, Vasiliy's participation in combat would be restricted and in flights he would be protected. Col Gen I.S. Glebov described to the author one such episode:

"At Stalingrad, near Shirokiy Farm, at the command post of the 4th Tank Army and in the presence of the commander, Gen Vasiliy Dmitriyevich Kryuchenkin, I witnessed the attack on nine of our aircraft by two German Messerschmitts, and our planes did not engage in battle but did everything possible to avoid it, having formed up in a circle and flying off, moving in a spiral. All of this was so disgraceful that upon instructions from

the army commander a telegram was sent off to the commander. The response received took us aback. It stated that the aircraft, after carrying out a combat mission, had been led to the airfield by Vasiliy Stalin and we were advised not to raise this question.

What was behind this episode is difficult to establish now. Certainly, Vasiliy could never be accused of cowardice. On the contrary, regardless of the prohibition by his father to participate in combat operations, over the 4 years of the war he made 27 combat sorties and downed 1 enemy aircraft.

From the documents describing his combat activities, this combat recommendation has come down to us [the document is abridged]:

[Beginning of document] Comrade V.I. Stalin holds the position of division commander as of the month of May 1944.... Personally Comrade Stalin possesses good organizational abilities and volitional qualities. He is tactically well trained, he has a good grasp of the operational situation and quickly and correctly finds his way on questions of conducting combat work.

In his work he is energetic, very enterprising and from his subordinates he always demands the precise execution of issued orders.

He can organize combat work of the regiment and the division.

Along with positive qualities, personally Guards Col V.I. Stalin has a number of major shortcomings.

By character he is hot-headed and short tempered, he does not show self-restraint and there have been instances where he laid hands on subordinates.

An insufficiently profound study of people as well as a not always serious approach to selecting personnel, particularly staff workers, have led to frequent changes in the positions of officer personnel. This did not contribute to the developing of teamwork in the staffs.

In his personal life he commits misdeeds which are not compatible with the position held of division commander, there have been instances of tactless conduct at flight personnel evenings and rudeness shown toward individual officers and there was a case of rash conduct, that is, driving off on a tractor from the airfield in Shyaulay with an argument and fight with the NKVD checkpoint.

State of health is weak, particularly nervous system, and he is extremely irritable. This has influenced the fact that recently in his flight work he has participated little in personal training and this has led to the poor working out of individual questions in flight training (orientation).

All these listed shortcomings to a significant degree reduce his authority as a commander and are incompatible with the position held of division commander.

He can command a division under the requisite condition of eliminating the designated shortcomings.

Commander of the I Minsk
Guards Fighter Air Corps
Guards Lt Gen Avn Beletskiy
25 January 1945
[End of document]

It must be admitted that the generals who signed such recommendations were not only honest persons but also courageous ones. However, this did not halt Vasilii's rapid ascent in his career. Subsequently, in 1946, he held the position of an air corps commander.

Had his father refused to assist in the career advancement of his son? There is no direct reply to this question. In truth, one of the persons interviewed by the author asserted that in 1946, Stalin specially shifted Corps Cmdr Savitskiy to Moscow, having appointed his son to his place. But the facts are different: the designated general was shifted to Moscow from the post of the commander of one air corps, but Vasilii was appointed to another, even in spite of such a certification:

[Beginning of document] ...Career officer since 1938, received his first rank in 1940, state of health poor with pains in feet and back, particularly in acceleration, over-fatigue and disturbance of nervous system. In personal life commits deeds which are not compatible with position of division commander.

Is rude in dealing with subordinates and extremely irritable.

The listed shortcomings to a significant degree reduce his authority as a commander-leader. Personally disciplined and ideologically strong.

Conclusion: For improving theoretical training it would be desirable to send him to study in the Air Forces Academy. Corresponds to the position held.

Commander of 16th Air Army,
Col Gen Avn Rudenko
20 July 1945

For improving theoretical training it would be desirable to send him to study in the Air Forces Academy. Meets the position held.

Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Occupation Forces in Germany, MSU Zhukov
Military Council Member of Group of Occupation Forces in Germany, Lt Gen Telegin
3 August 1945
[End of document]

Could the father not have known about his son's conduct and about his shortcomings? Stalin was a person who kept thousands of people under his watchful eye. Here one could probably put it this way: his noninterference into the career of his son was the greatest support for the latter.

For the sake of justice, it must be pointed out that a certification signed in July 1946 stated the following:

[Beginning of document] Maj Gen Avn Stalin can fly the following aircraft: Po-2, Ut-1, Ut-2, I-15, I-153, MiG-3, LaGG-3, Yak-1, Yak-7, Yak-9, Il-2, Boston, Siebel, La-5, La-7 and Hurricane; his total flying hours are 3,174 hours and 15 minutes.

He has been in command of the division since February 1945 and under his leadership the division's units in carrying out the UBP [combat training] plan in 1946 made a total of 14,111 sorties with flying hours of 8,376 hours and 12 minutes, including 5,628 flights on La-5 combat aircraft with flying hours of 4,021 hours and 58 minutes. On the Po-2 there were 5,091 flights during the day with flying hours of 2,996 hours and 27 minutes and at night 3,392 flights with a flying time of 1,357 hours and 47 minutes.

The flight personnel of the division's units has worked out a take-off in eighths and landings in twos and fours. The pilots have mastered well firing at air and ground targets. In the division great attention is given to firing using gun cameras and a total of 7,635 firings have been made from gun cameras. Training of the flight technical personnel in the division has been well organized and is carried out on a planned basis in the division's training lab which consists of 16 well-equipped classrooms. The technical-operating service of the division is also well organized as can be seen from the fact that during the certification period there was not a single instance of the failure of equipment due to the fault of the technical personnel. During the work year the division's engineer and technical personnel have made 4,439 minor and routine repairs, 112 emergency repairs and 1,833 engine repairs. The division's staff is well trained and works well: over the designated period, the division has conducted 3 two-sided tactical regimental flight exercises involving the flight personnel of 4 regiments in cooperation with the bombers.

In the first half of 1946, 22 tactical flight exercises were conducted and they were all carried out in an organized manner without incident. As a whole, the division in terms of the fulfilling of the plan for all types of combat training holds first place in the corps. Over the time which has passed since the war, the division has noticeably matured and has become more organized. The flight personnel is fully trained to carry out combat missions at medium altitudes, 40 percent of the pilots can fly at great altitudes and under instrument weather conditions. Maj Gen Avn Stalin himself possesses good organizational abilities and his operational-tactical training is good. He is able to get his combat experience across to the flight

personnel. In work he is energetic and enterprising and seeks these same qualities from subordinates. In his work he pays great attention to new equipment and frequently submits innovative ideas and tenaciously carries them out. He organizes flight work boldly and in a procedurally correct manner.

State of health is bad. Quick-tempered and irritable, and is not always able to restrain himself. In dealing with subordinates he is rude, and sometimes is too trusting of subordinates even at a time when they are not trained and are not capable of carrying out the commander's decision. These shortcomings of a personal nature reduce his authority as a commander-leader. Personally disciplined, ideologically strong, morally steadfast.

Conclusion: fully corresponds to the position held, could be submitted for a promotion and it would be advisable to use him in the inspector personnel of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Forces.

Commander of Fighter Air Corps,
Lt Gen Avn Savitskiy
7 July 1946

Agreed with certification of corps commander. Division in terms of combat training holds a leading place in the army. Merits promotion to position of corps commander. Must eliminate shortcomings indicated in certification, although there has been a sharp and noticeable improvement in comparison with the past.

Commander of Air Army,
Col Gen Avn Rudenko
8 July 1946
[End of document]

Being the commander of an air corps, Vasily devoted a great deal of time to improving the physical plant as well as concern for the life of the personnel, the officers and their family. At that time he also proved to be a passionate hunter and fisherman and became involved with hunting dogs. One of the former pilots told the author about an instance when Vasily presented him with two purebred hunting puppies for successes in flight training. But it later happened that they accidentally ate a can of glue and died. Vasily's anger was terrible.

Vasily would command an air corps for just a year. In July 1947, he was appointed the assistant commander for administrative and supply matters for the air forces of the Moscow Military District. The uniform of the 26-year-old major general aviation was decorated with two Orders of the Red Banner, Order of Suvorov 2d Degree, the medals for the defense of Moscow, for the defense of Stalingrad, for the liberation of Warsaw, for the taking of Berlin, for victory over Germany in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. From this period in the activities of V.I. Stalin in his documents there is the following note of 22 May 1948: By the order of the commander-in-chief of the Air Forces a commendation

is to be made "for good organization of flights between districts and for the prompt ferrying of large groups of LaGG-3 aircraft as well as for the receiving and supply of these aircraft."

Vasily before transfer to Moscow did not remain for more than 2 years in one position and in the capital his dizzying ascent up the rungs of the career ladder continued. On 18 June 1948, at the age of 27, Vasily Iosifovich Stalin assumed the post of commander of the Air Forces of the Moscow Military District. The order for his appointment was signed by MSU N.A. Bulganin. The signature of his father, I.V. Stalin, will be on a copy of the Decree of the USSR Council of Ministers of 11 May 1949 awarding him the rank of lieutenant general aviation.

Vasily Stalin zealously set to work. At first he would be engaged in flight training for the personnel and then become involved in personnel problems. Airfield and barracks construction unknown before him would get underway. He would begin preparing air parades with great care.

The high position and the patronage of the superior leadership, unfortunately, would create a situation of all-permissiveness around him. And he began to drink, not going to his job literally for weeks. After an unsuccessful air parade in 1952, the father himself signed an order removing his son from his position and in the presence of his closest assistants called him a "good-for-nothing," "fool" and enrolled him...as a student on the aviation faculty of the General Staff Military Academy. But Vasily was not to go to class. The death of his father put an end to this segment of his life.

In the evening of 1 March 1953, Vasily telephoned his father over the direct line. To his amazement, no one picked up the receiver. After a certain time, he called back. This time the receiver was taken up by the duty officer which in and of itself was strange and was told that Stalin was resting. At about 0400 hours in the morning, Vasily called again. Beriya immediately picked up the phone:

"Comrade Stalin is tired. He must rest. You don't need to come," and hung up.

Vasily reached his father only on the morning of 2 March. He was able to recreate the previous events after speaking with a servant in his quarters. He was told that Stalin had not been given the required medical aid for approximately 13-14 hours and an operation had not been made. All of this taken together made it possible for Vasily subsequently to assert that his father had "been done away with." Of course, much in the given assertion is debatable, however there are definite coincidences in the story of Maj (Ret) A.T. Rybin, one of the officers from Stalin's guard and published in the journal SOTSIOLOGICHESKIYE ISSLEDOVANIYA, No 3 for 1988.

On 6 March 1953, the first columns of the central newspapers were bordered in black. They all published the announcement: "On 5 March at 2150 hours, I.V. Stalin died." On 9 March an official funeral was held on Red Square with the body being interred in the Mausoleum. On 26 March, Lt Gen Avn V.I. Stalin, in accord with the Regulation Governing Military Service by Officer Personnel, was to be discharged from the ranks of the Soviet Army into the Reserves under Article 59 Point "f" without the right to wear a uniform.

Due to the fact that the 32-year-old lieutenant general aviation had served 14 calendar years and 4 months and in terms of benefits 30 years and 4 months, he was given a pension of 4,950 rubles and a single grant of 6 months salary. Its setting in the discharge, a second copy of which is kept in the personal file, was signed by the Chief of the Main Personnel Directorate, Col Gen A.S. Zheltov.

The subsequent events were described in rather great detail by his sister, Svetlana Alliluyeva, in her memoirs. She recalled that regardless of the changes which had occurred, Vasilii continued to consider himself omnipotent.

He spent April 1943 alone, without friends, in restaurants, in drinking bouts, abusing everyone and everything. He was arrested on 28 April. Embezzlement surfaced and instances of exceeding authority. The Military Collegium of the USSR Supreme Court condemned him to 8 years. From prison he wrote desperate letters to the government. In the winter of 1953-1954, Vasilii fell ill and was transferred to a hospital. There he again began to drink. Ultimately he had to be returned to Vladimir Prison. There he was visited by his sister, his wife and other relatives. He demanded that they go see, phone up and talk about him wherever possible and free him from prison. In desperation he rushed about searching for anyone to ask or anyone to write, appealing to all members of the government.

Vasilii stayed in Vladimir until January 1960.

Thus, Vasilii was released after almost 7 years since his arrest. He was left in Moscow, he was given an apartment on Frunze Quay and a dacha in Zhukovka, restored to the party without an interruption and not deprived of his general's rank and pension.

He began to be interested in Air Forces matters and call his former fellow servicemen. The author was told of one of these conversations by A.Ye. Borovykh who during the war years was the commander of a regiment under Vasilii and who now held a high position in the National Air Defense Troops: "Vasilii's call caught me in my office. He questioned me in detail about the present of aviation, about the equipment, the personnel, about the missions and about the problems which we were working on now. We agreed to meet. I set off. But there was no meeting. On the road Vasilii had had an accident with

the representative of a foreign embassy and in addition had a row with him. In April 1960, he was returned to prison to "serve out" his term. He emerged from there in the spring of 1961. By this time he was a complete invalid with an ailing liver and a progressing stomach ulcer.

He was not permitted to live in Moscow and, having chosen Kazan, he left for there, where he settled into a one-room apartment and had the benefits of a reserve general. It was there that Vasilii learned that Stalin's body had been removed from the Mausoleum on 31 October 1961.

It must be pointed out that Vasilii's personal life also did not go well. After his death which occurred on 19 March 1962, four children were left: two from the first marriage and two adopted from the last. On his grave there is a slab with the inscription "To the Unique."

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskii zhurnal", 1989.

Bukharin-Voroshilov Correspondence on High-Level Purges

00010008g VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 70-71

[Documents, published under the heading "Documents and Materials" prepared by O. Fedotov: "I Embrace You for You Are Untouched"]

[Text] [Introduction] The letters published below are dated 1936 (N.I. Bukharin to K.Ye. Voroshilov and K.Ye. Voroshilov to N.I. Bukharin). They figured in the text of the first speech given by Voroshilov (24 February 1937) at the February-March (1937) VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee Plenum. K.Ye. Voroshilov considered it necessary to quote these letters in order to prove the "antiparty stance" of N.I. Bukharin.

By that time a number of political trials had already been conducted in the nation. All of them, as has now been finally established, were fabricated by I.V. Stalin and his henchmen in the aims of suppressing even the slightest dissident thought as well as for the physical extermination of possible opponents and establishing an absolute unchecked regime of personal power. The largest of these was the trial of the so-called "anti-Soviet united Trotskyite-Zinovyevite bloc" (19-24 August 1936) in the course of which L.B. Kamenev, for still not understood reasons, testified that Bukharin supposedly with him had participated in counterrevolutionary activity. Each of them would have understood at that time what such evidence would mean. The trial ended with the execution of 16 persons, including Kamenev and Zinovyev. At present, it is officially recognized that all those sentenced were condemned unjustly. The sentence was abrogated and the case halted for the lack of evidence of a crime.

Soon after Kamenev's testimony, clearly in the last days of August 1936, Bukharin sent out letters to all members of the VKP(b) Central Committee Politburo and to the USSR Procurator Vyshinskiy. In addition, he sent a personal letter to Voroshilov. This letter like the reply are unique human documents characterizing the relations between two former friends at an acute turning point in history. In Bukharin's letter one feels the confusion and perplexity over the developing situation. It shows that he still believed in the officially announced guilt of the executed Kamenev, Zinovyev and other "dogs" as well as in the "leadership of Koba (one of Stalin's pseudonyms). At the same time, the letter shows the courageous struggle of the author against slanderous accusations, the decisive defense of the dignity of the revolutionary and the steadfastness of a dedicated party fighter.

The reply letter from K. Ye. Voroshilov of 30 September 1936 shows something else. This document, like the entire speech by Voroshilov directed against Bukharin and given at the February-March VKP(b) Central Committee Plenum, shows convincingly that this person was a faithful and obsequious Stalinist henchman. Soon after the Plenum over his own signature he sanctioned on false evidence the arrest of many thousands of commanders, political workers and supervisory personnel who had been raised by the Soviet state. The letters offered here to the readers have been taken from the text of the speech of K. Ye. Voroshilov (a typed copy made by himself). [End of Introduction]

[Letter from Bukharin to Voroshilov]

Dear Kliment Yefremovich!

You probably have already received my letter to the Politburo members and to Vyshinskiy. I sent it tonight to the secretariat of Comrade Stalin with a request to distribute it: it contains everything essential relating to the monstrously false accusations of Kamenev. (I am writing now and experience a feeling of semi-reality: was this a dream, a mirage, an insane asylum, a hallucination? No, this was reality.)

I want to ask one thing: Do you believe it all? Is it true?

Now I have written an article about Kirov. Kirov, incidentally, when I was in disgrace (and it served me right) and at the same time was ill in Leningrad, came to see me, he spent the entire day, he wrapped me up, gave me his private railroad car, sent me to Moscow and with such tender concern that I will remember this all my life. Did I write insincerely about Sergey [Kirov]?

Pose the question honestly. If it was insincere, then I must be immediately arrested and destroyed, for such scoundrels must not be tolerated.

And if you feel [that it was] "insincere" and you yourselves leave me at liberty, then you yourselves are cowards not meriting respect.

But if you yourselves do not believe what was thought up by that cynic Kamenev, the most loathsome of persons, that human carrion, then why did you allow the resolutions where (the Kiev, for example) states that I "knew" god knows what?

Where then is the purpose of the investigation, the revolutionary legality and so forth?

For example, if the Kiev party aktiv decides that he did know, then how can the investigator say "he did not know" if the party said "he did"?

I am well aware that once such a statement was made publically in the court (although this was scarcely the first time it came out in court; what about the preliminary investigation? Why wasn't I summoned?), then the investigation would logically stem from this. But then we should wait for its end, not be in a hurry and not compromise revolutionary legality itself.

You called the "rightists" the assistants of the Zinovyevites and Trotskyites (in a speech about S.S. Kamenev).¹ At the given time, this was a slogan. But for you it was for other reasons, but in the masses this is not understood so sharply. Does it mean that you believe this entire monstrous thing?

Then don't draw out the proceeding and settle things faster. In history there are instances when significant people and superior politicians also make fatal errors "of a particular order" and then I will be a mathematical coefficient of your particular error...(from the viewpoint of history) this is a trifle, literary material.

In truth, I, to the degree that I can still think straight, would feel that from the international viewpoint it is stupid to broaden the basis of the rabble (this would mean to accept the desires of the scoundrel Kamenev! What they want to show is that they were not alone). But I will not mention this if you feel that I am requesting leniency under the pretext of high-level policy.

But I want the truth: it is on my side. In my times I have sinned much before the party and I have suffered greatly because of this.

But I would state again and again with great inner conviction that I was in all these last years defending party policy and the leadership of Koba, although I did not engage in sycophancy.

It was wonderful to fly above the clouds the day before yesterday: 8 degrees of frost, diamond purity and calm grandeur.

Possibly I have written you some twaddle. Don't be angry. Possibly in such times it is unpleasant for you to receive a letter from me. God knows, anything is possible.

But "in any event" I assure you (who has always been so favorably disposed to me): your conscience should be completely calm; I have not failed you and I am actually not guilty of anything. Sooner or later this will be brought out no matter how they try to besmirch my name.

Poor Tomskiy! He probably also "became caught up," I do not know. I do not exclude it. He lived alone. Possibly had I gone to see him he would not have been so gloomy and not become caught up. Human life is complicated!

But that is being lyrical. And here it is a matter of politics, a thing that is little lyrical and rather severe.

That they executed the dogs makes me completely happy. Trotsky was politically killed by the trial and this will soon become perfectly obvious.

If I am still alive by the time of the war, I would request to fight (not a fine word) and then you could render me one last service and make me a private in the army (even if a Kamenev poisoned bullet were to hit me).

I advise you at some time to read the drama from the French Revolution by Romand Rolland.²

Forgive me for the gloomy letter: thousands of thoughts gallop through my head like frenzied horses and I have no strong reins.

I embrace you because you are untouched.

Nik. Bukharin

[Letter to Bukharin from Voroshilov]

Comrade Bukharin.³

I return your letter in which you permitted yourself malicious attacks against the party leadership. If by your letter you wish to persuade me of your complete innocence, the only thing you persuaded me of was to keep further distance from you in the future regardless of the results of the investigation on your case and if you do not abandon the vile epithets against the party leadership, I will consider you also a scoundrel.

K. Voroshilov
30 September 1936

Footnotes

1. N.I. Bukharin has in mind the speech of K.Ye. Voroshilov given on 27 August 1936 at the funeral of the Army Cmdr 1st Rank S.S. Kamenev where he said:

"During the years of the intense struggle for socialist construction...the party overcame the rabid resistance of all the capitalist elements in the nation and repelled the evil intrigues of the counterrevolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovyeve bands and their rightist assistants..." (see: PRAVDA, 28 August 1936).

2. By this time Romand Rolland had written 7 of his planned 12 dramas concerning the Great French Bourgeois Revolution. Some of them ("July 14" and "Danton") were part of the 20-volume collected works of this writer.

3. Voroshilov explained the history of the writing of his reply letter in the following manner: "The letter (from Bukharin—Editors) was written in such a manner that you did not immediately notice that this clever sophistry struck at the Central Committee and accused it of cowardice and so forth.

"Incidentally, at the Politburo in the absence of Comrades Stalin and Molotov, we quickly read this very letter together with Comrades Kaganovich, the deceased Sergo, Andreyev and Yezhov and did not notice the main thing.

"It was only several days later, in reading this letter, that Comrade Molotov noticed the vile attacks against the Central Committee.

"I admit that I did not intend to reply to Bukharin but having studied his letter, I saw that a reply was essential."

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989.

Autobiographical Sketch by Uborevich

00010008h VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL
in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89)
pp 81-83

[Article, published under the heading "The Age in Autobiographies": "Iyeronim Petrovich Uborevich"]

[Text] [Editorial Introduction] Iyeronim Petrovich Uborevich (1896-1937) was a Soviet military leader. He participated in World War I as a lieutenant. He was a member of the CPSU since 1917. In December 1917, he was chosen commander of a Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Regiment. In 1918, he participated in fighting against the White Guards and the Romanian occupiers and was awarded the Order of the Red Banner (1919). In 1918-1920, he commanded a rifle division and armies. For the liberation of the Northern Caucasus, he was awarded an honorary revolutionary weapon (1920). For fighting in the area of Berdyansk—Melitopol in October-November 1920, he was awarded a second Order of the Red Banner. In January-April 1921, he was the assistant commander of the Ukraine and the Crimea. In suppressing the Antonov uprising he was the deputy commander

of Tambov Province. In the summer of 1921, he commanded the troops of Minsk Province and led the defeat of the bands of S.N. Bulak-Bulakhovich. In 1921-1922, he was the commander of the 5th Army and the East Siberian Military District. In August-November 1922, he was the defense minister and commander-in-chief of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic and a member of Dalburo [Far Eastern Bureau] of the RKP(b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee. For the liberation of the Maritime Province, he was awarded a third Order of the Red Banner. Subsequently, he held various command positions as army commander 1st rank. He was a candidate member of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik)] Central Committee from 1930. A member of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] and the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee]. He died in 1937 during the repressions.

[Autobiography]

I was born at the end of December 1896 in the old style in the village of Antandriya, Antoletskaia Volost, Novoaleksandrovskiy District [Uyezd] in Kovno Province. My parents were Lithuanian peasants who had formerly been serfs. There was around three-quarters of a desyatina of land per person. All the years, from 1896 through 1909, I spent in the village taking part as I was able in work on the farm, first as a shepherd and from the age of 10 in all work including plowing and harrowing. During the winters I studied in the nearby rural school in the hamlet of Dusyaty. They say that I showed great ability and the teacher, in showing individual concern for me, in the 3d grade prepared me as a day student at the Real School in Dvinsk where I passed [the exam]. As a boy in Dusyaty, I was in the organization of "Sicilians" and without precisely knowing the goals and tasks, I distributed proclamations copying them by hand for reproduction.

1909-1914. I studied in the Real School in Dvinsk. Since my parents could not help me in any way, I had to earn my living by giving lessons and sometimes even helped my father. I lived in the suburbs with a distant relative who was a stoker. In the summer I traveled to the village and worked on the farm. Although I lived among workers, I did not come across any political grouping. I only participated in the so-called "mass actions." The years passed in complete political apathy. In 1914, I tried to begin my studies in an institute, but I had no funds and had to give lessons, and then later in 1915 I returned to the village to work in agriculture.

In 1915 during the summer in Lithuania because of the excesses of the Cossacks and the forced mobilizations, I took part in a small "....." [blank in document], this was something like a small bunt against the police. I was turned over to the court by the Kovno governor but I hid out in St. Petersburg where I was taken into the army with others of my same age. In the spring of 1916 I completed the Constantine Artillery School.

On the front in 1916 I served in the 15th Heavy Artillery Division as a junior officer. It was ordinary life on the front, without even a hint of political thought. By the end of 1916, I began to grow close to certain comrades who were members of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] but I did not know the differences of Bolshevism and Menchevism. From 1917, from the moment of the February Revolution (our unit was in Bessarabia), the work of political parties got underway and I could finally define myself in political terms.

I cannot say that I quickly had a clear understanding of everything but the main thing was that I was against the war, against the bourgeoisie and in favor of Soviet power. This I recognized and began to work actively.

Our cell in the 15th Heavy Artillery Battalion of 11 men was almost completely destroyed in the stormy days of 1917. In August 1917, I found myself a lecturer at soldier courses in the 5th Army (Tsarist). In these same courses the Red Guard was being organized and during the October days of 1917 I became the head of it, being the platoon commander before this. After this I devoted myself to work in the Red Guard. With the 1918 German offensive, on 18 February the entire detachment was destroyed, I was wounded and taken prisoner. I stayed 4 1/2 months in the German prison and escaped from Rakishek in July 1918 to Soviet Russia. After arrival in Soviet Russia, I traveled with a detachment of soldiers from Petrograd to the Arkhangelsk Front against an English landing force.... I initially worked as a battery commander and then a detachment commander and after that the commander of the Northern Dvina Brigade and a division commander until 18 August 19.... [blank in document] In October 1919, I took over the 14th Army and conducted operations until February 1920. In February I took over the 9th Army in the Caucasus and conducted operations until the taking of Krasnodar, Novorossiysk. Then again I took over the 14th Army and fought against the Poles. From August 1920 through 15 November, I was in command of the 13th Army and fought against Wrangel and then with the 14th Army against Petlyura. Later in the summer of 1921, I fought against the Tambov bandits. I put down banditism in Belorussia as the commander of the Belorussian region. From August 1921, I was in command of the 5th Army in Siberia against Ungern, Bakich in the liberation of Mongolia. In 1922, as the commander-in-chief of the People's Revolutionary Army, I conducted an operation for the liberation of the Far Eastern Republic from the Japanese. Later I was the commander of the 5th Army until 1 June 1924. I fell ill with a general ailment and recovered until arrival in the Urals Military District.

During all of this time, as can be seen, of purely military service, I was engaged in party and political work as a Red Army worker.

I participated in party conferences and Soviet congresses. From 1922 until my departure from the Far East in 1924, I was a member of the Dalburo of the RKP(b)

Central Committee. This period provided me with the greatest opportunity to partake in party and Soviet work. In the sense of my political education to a significant degree I am a practical worker, self-taught and have still not been able to master everything in the theory of sociological sciences. My work day averages around 10-12 hours. My health is poor. My family consists of two children and a wife and my salary is 165 rubles.

20 December 1924
Uborevich

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal". 1989.

Articles Not Translated from VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL No 2, 1989
00010008i Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, Feb 89 (signed to press 25 Jan 89 p 1

[Text]The Army and Culture (Karem Rash)....(pp 3-15)

Nazi Germany: 1940 (A.S. Anufriyev)(pp 72-78)

The Secret of File "N" (B.G. Khudoleev, V.A. Zakharov)(pp 79-80)

"The True Signed Thus....," A.V. Suvorov on Himself (Yu.N. Lubchenkov)(pp 82-91)

The Smolensk Ulans in the Revolution (G.V. Razhnev)(pp 92-94)

Konstantin Vasilyev (A.V. Timofeyev)(pp 94-96)

Publication Data

00010008j Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 2, 1989 (signed to press 25 Jan 89

English title: MILITARY HISTORY JOURNAL

Russian title: VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL

Editor-in-Chief: V.I. Filatov

Publishing house: Krasnaya Zvezda

Place of publication: Moscow

Date of publication: February 1989

Signed to press: 25 January 1989

COPYRIGHT: "Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal", 1989

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

16 Aug 1989